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Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental 
Disease 
 
Melissa Hamilton* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Sexual deviance is a topic of virtually infinite allure, captivating the 
media’s attention and causing widespread apprehension both inside the 
criminal justice system and in the public-at-large.
1
 With the recent 
foment of fear about sexually violent predators, lawmakers have sought 
ways to reduce the perceived risk to public safety and to calm their 
constituents’ concerns. The prevailing strategy is a medicalization of 
social control in which officials employ certain psychiatric illnesses 
related to unusual sexual preferences to justify a host of civil and 
criminal laws in managing sex offender populations. In psychiatry’s 
nosology—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(“DSM”)2—mental disorders of sexual deviance are called paraphilias. 
Paraphilias are particularly salient in being considered relatively 
synonymous with sex-based crimes.
3
 In slang, paraphilias are bizarre, 
kinky, or weird sex,
4
 while in legal terms they are generally considered 
sexual perversions or deviances.
5
 The clinical DSM characterization of 
paraphilias delineates sexual fantasies or behaviors that involve unusual 
objects, activities, or situations and are usually accompanied by 
 
  * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; J.D.; 
Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin. Much appreciation to Cynthia Lee, Ruth Jones, 
and Carissa Hessick for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Richard L. Lippke, Why Sex (Offending) is Different, 30 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 151, 
151 (2011) (“[T]he public has some kind of peculiar hang-up about crimes involving 
sex.”). 
2. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS DSM-IV-TR (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
3. ANIL AGGRAWAL, FORENSIC AND MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF SEXUAL CRIMES 
AND UNUSUAL SEXUAL PRACTICES 2 (2009) (frequently illegal, paraphilias are uniquely 
attractive). 
4. See id. at 4. 
5. Fabian M. Saleh et al., The Management of Sex Offenders: Perspectives for 
Psychiatry, 18 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 359, 366 (2010). 
1
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significant distress or impairment in social functioning.
6
 A few of the 
current DSM paraphilias are pedophilia, sexual sadism and masochism, 
exhibitionism, voyeurism, and the polymorphous category of paraphilia 
not otherwise specified.
7
 
The attribution of a sex-based mental disorder can have significant 
legal consequences in providing the government a justification to 
infringe upon a defendant’s interests in liberty and privacy. For example, 
studies of factors leading to forensic recommendations in favor of sexual 
predator civil commitment consistently show that instances involving a 
paraphilia diagnosis are significant predictors of outcomes in favor of 
involuntary commitment.
8
 In criminal cases, a paraphilia diagnosis has 
been employed for various purposes. Disorders of sexual deviance are 
cited to deny bail pending trial.
9
 There may be sentencing repercussions 
from the presence of paraphilic disorder to justify a prison sentence as 
opposed to community supervision
10
 and, as an aggravating factor, to 
support a longer term of imprisonment.
11
 Judges in many cases have 
ruled that a pedophilia diagnosis, for example, warranted extended 
sentences, as it was relevant to protecting society.
12
 United States 
Sentencing Commission members and expert witnesses called before a 
public hearing in 2012 about the appropriateness of lengthy sentences for 
child sexual exploitation offenders evidently agree, since at least a dozen 
times they cited the prevalence of paraphilias in the offender group.
13
 
 
6. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 535. 
7. Id. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 116-29. 
9. E.g., United States v. Blauvelt, No. WDQ-08-0269, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87060, at *15–19 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2008); United States v. Colin, No. 1:07-CR-512, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91409, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007); United States v. Coffey, No. 
5:01-CR-268, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10452, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2001); State v. 
Enrique T., 937 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207-08 (App. Div. 2012). 
10. State v. Lottie, No. 93050, 2010 WL 2333052, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 
2010). 
11. E.g., United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2011); Wells v. 
United States, No. 3:07cv1740, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5332, at *38 n.10 (D. Conn. Jan. 
25, 2010); People v. Myers, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11484, at *3 (Ct. App. Dec. 
21, 2006). 
12. E.g., United States v. Hammonds, No. 10-6498, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7099, at 
*8 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012); United States v. Garnette, 474 F.3d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 
2007); State v. Yingling, No. 2-307 / 11-1537, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 329, at *2 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 2012); Wisconsin v. Roders, Nos. 84-1222-CR and 84-1223-CR, 1985 Wisc. 
App. LEXIS 3472, at *14 (Ct. App. June 12, 1985). 
13. Child Pornography Offenses: Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2, 112-13, 128, 169, 236 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
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Paraphilias have been consequential in death penalty sentencing 
hearings, offered by the prosecution as an aggravating factor suggesting 
the need for complete incapacitation.
14
 Parole decisions can be impacted, 
too. A paraphilia diagnosis has encouraged officials to mandate mental 
health treatment as a condition of parole,
15
 postpone parole release,
16
 or 
entirely deny parole.
17
 
On the other hand, defense counsel have cited mental disorders of 
sexual deviance as benefiting their clients’ legal positions. 
Characterizing the existence of a paraphilia as a mitigating factor, 
defendants have argued that a lesser sentence is justified
18
 or that a death 
sentence is undeserved in capital cases.
19
 They have also offered 
paraphilia diagnoses to support incompetency
20
 or to support an insanity 
defense.
21
 
 
120215-16/Hearing_Transcript_20120215.pdf. 
14. Lynch v. Hudson, No. 2:07-cv-948, 2011 WL 4537890, at *76 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 
28, 2011) (noting prosecutor argued defendant deserved death for his status as a 
pedophile); State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 274-76 (Kan. 2001) (while defendant argued 
mitigating, prosecutor countered, asserting it meant defendant would pose a risk in prison 
to weaker male inmates). 
15. People v. Holmgren, No. B205684, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9559, at *3–
4 (Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008) (pedophilia); People v. Johnson, No. B196843, 2008 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 817, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008) (paraphilia not otherwise 
specified). 
16. E.g., Hess v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 915 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (pedophilia); McClure v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 237 P.3d 
879, 881 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (rape paraphilia); Davis v. Lampert, 25 P.3d 408, 411 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2001) (exhibitionism and voyeurism). 
17. E.g., Ehler v. Nooth, 384 F. App’x 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Cody, No. 
D058970, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7308, at *4 (Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2011); 
McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 790 A.2d 974 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
18. United States v. Freeman, 194 F. App’x 777, 779 (11th Cir. 2006) (paraphilia 
involving sexual interest in children); United States v. Roderick, No. 2:10-CR-741-DCN, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81086, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2011); United States v. Williams, 
No. ACM 35350, 2004 CCA LEXIS 269, at *9–10 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) 
(exhibitionism, frotteurism). 
19. Many cases involve sexual sadism. E.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 
1316 (11th Cir. 2006); State v. Smith, 159 P.3d 531, 542 (Ariz. 2007); Ault v. State, 53 
So. 3d 175, 193 (Fla. 2010) (ruling pedophilia mitigating in compelling the defendant to 
kidnap); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1283 (Fla. 2009); see also People v. Runge, 917 
N.E.2d 940, 986 (Ill. 2009) (ruling sexual sadism does not render death sentence cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
20. State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 146 (Conn. 2005) (sexual sadism); State v. 
Bordelon, 2007-0525, p. 19 (La. 10/16/09); 33 So.3d 842, 855 (sexual sadism). 
21. E.g., Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (pedophilia); 
United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (pedophilia); see also 
Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding constitutional error in 
3
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The psychiatric diseases of the paraphilias are now entrenched in 
the law in decisions concerning culpability, desert, and risk. Though, as 
the foregoing cases suggest, it is a tough balancing act, considering the 
existence of psychiatric illness suggests less responsibility, while at the 
same time implying a greater risk of future dangerousness.
22
 To better 
navigate this conundrum, the law has drawn on the psychiatric sciences. 
Part II of this Article outlines a basic need for law and science to serve 
each other even though they may not share objectives. With respect to 
the advent of new laws to control sex offenders, a law-psychiatry 
interface is utilized, whereby sexual offenders diagnosed with mental 
disorders can face negative legal consequences. Part III shows how 
diagnostic criteria have been interpreted to allow the use of sexual 
offenses as a proxy to diagnose mental disorder. The problem is that 
psychiatric diseases do not commit sex crimes—people do.23 This Part 
also outlines reasons why the mutually reinforcing nature of this 
professional combination ignores substantial evidence that the DSM-
based disorders of sexual deviance suffer substantial empirical and 
normative flaws. Part IV argues that the conflation of sexual crimes with 
mental illness is largely pretextual to serve the interests of criminal 
justice officials in justifying preventive detention. Overall, the 
paraphilias are a poor fit to answer legal questions about whether 
infringement upon substantial personal interests is lawfully appropriate. 
A review of case law, though, shows that legal challenges to the use of 
paraphilias for case adjudications, whether using the Frye/Daubert 
thresholds for the admissibility of scientific evidence or due process 
standards, have generally been unsuccessful. Finally, Part V provides 
concluding remarks, including a warning that a law-psychiatry interface 
can in a similar manner be exploited to apply to virtually any type of 
deviance, simply by linking it to mental disease. 
 
 
 
 
 
not providing court-appointed experts to assist an insanity defense based on sexual 
sadism). 
22. See Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 695 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying ineffective 
assistance claim for failing to offer evidence of sexual sadism, noting that despite 
“alleged mitigation value,” the disorder is “repellent”). 
23. Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (Nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 495, 498 (2006). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
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II. Sex Offender Policy Driven by the Specter of Mental Disease 
 
The law often seeks input from the sciences.
24
 This inquiry can be 
mutually beneficial. Legal practitioners seek information from scientists 
to address relevant legal issues, while scientists gain tangible and 
practical benefits when their services and research are sought. Both 
disciplines, in some sense, seek consensus. For law, that consensus often 
is in the form of a normative inquiry with an ontological assumption that 
a definitive answer can be ascertained.
25
 For science, it is the 
collaborative establishment of testable theories to explain or predict the 
phenomenon at issue.
26
 Yet the law-science interface can be problematic 
considering that their epistemological foundations and pragmatic goals 
differ.
27
 From the epistemic perspective, “[l]aw is a discipline of the 
humanities, based upon beliefs, arguments, and deduction. Truth, in law, 
is derived . . . by persuasion and argument.”28 Science, though, seeks 
truth through observable phenomena, utilizing empiricism, observation, 
and experimentation.
29
 The goals of the disciplines are often 
incongruous. The law’s normative inquiry is inherently value-laden and 
targeted toward a subjectively-derived notion of achieving justice.
30
 
Science’s heuristic method seeks a more objectively-derived 
knowledge.
31
 These disciplinary differences are so structurally 
fundamental that it appears unnecessary to recognize these corollaries: 
(1) science cannot commandeer the law’s normative inquiry, and (2) the 
law should not undermine the integrity of science.
32
 Nonetheless, both 
rules are severely tested in the high profile area of sex offender policy, 
 
24. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 366 (noting legal theory must evolve and be 
informed by discoveries in science and medicine). 
25. Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior 
and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 78 (2008). 
26. See generally Michael Friedman, Explanation and Scientific Understanding, 71 
J. PHIL. 5 (1974). 
27. Erickson, supra note 25, at 78 (“The goals of each discipline [law and science] 
are inconsistent even when they appear identical because of their different approaches to 
understanding the problem to begin with.”); Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent 
Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 359–
60 (2008) (“In any context, the science-law interface must negotiate the potential for 
breakdown in three basic areas: translation, boundaries, and evaluation.”). 
28. Erickson, supra note 25, at 71. 
29. Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002). 
30. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 359–60. 
31. Erickson, supra note 25, at 78; Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360. 
32. Erickson, supra note 25, at 78. 
5
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which has evolved so as to be dependent on the intersection between law 
and the science of psychiatry. 
 
A. Medicalization of Social Control 
 
Sex crimes remain a prominent legal and public issue as society 
continues to be in the grip of a moral panic about sexual offenders.
33
 The 
media and lawmakers have reified the image of the sexually violent 
predator (the “SVP”).34 Other works have explained why this image is 
mostly mythical and the SVP is, in reality, a socio-legal construct.
35
 A 
result of the hype has been a plethora of new laws, as well as a 
strengthening of existing legal frameworks, specifically for sexual 
offenses (generally referred to herein as “SVP laws”).36 These employ a 
penological mixture of punishment, incapacitation, and treatment. The 
consequences of these unique laws targeting sex-based offenses and 
sexual offenders include denying bail, adding conditions for supervised 
release, lengthening sentences, restricting parole, imposing sex offender 
registry requirements and residency restrictions, and seeking sex 
offender civil commitments.
37
 The foregoing necessarily involve civil 
rights interests because they infringe upon liberty and privacy,
38
 thereby 
rendering SVP laws as a human rights issue deserving attention and 
vigilance.
39
 
Policy analysts have offered explanations for the unique reaction to 
sex offenders. There are concerns about the connection between 
particularly harmful behaviors against vulnerable groups—here being 
women and children—and the presumption of long-term propensity for 
 
33. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: 
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 697, 
700–01 (2011). 
34. Id. 
35. Id.; Michael Petrunik et al., American and Canadian Approaches to Sex 
Offenders: A Study of the Politics of Dangerousness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 111 (2008). 
36. For examples of such new and existing laws, see Hamilton, supra note 33, at 
702–07. 
37. TRACY VELÁZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PURSUIT OF SAFETY: SEX 
OFFENDER POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Sex_offender_policy_with_a
ppendices_final.pdf. 
38. Hamilton, supra note 33, at 702–07. 
39. Charles Moser & Peggy J. Kleinplatz, DSM-IV-TR and the Paraphilias: An 
Argument for Removal, 17 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM. SEXUALITY 91, 93 (2006). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
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sexual recidivism.
40
 Together, these fears have fostered an idiosyncratic 
model of criminal justice that trades the normal foundation of 
proportionality of punishment for crimes with an inherently risk-based 
model underlying the SVP laws.
41
 This is true despite the fact that risk-
based assessments for sex offenders are inherently faulty in being 
simultaneously subjective and unreliable.
42
 
The special treatment of dangerous sex offenders often is based on a 
moralistic philosophy that is inherently confused by whether they are 
mad or bad,
43
 or, more likely, some combination thereof. Thus, the risk 
model has adopted a disease mentality through the conflation of medical 
pathology and its assumed consequence of evil behaviors.
44
 The existing 
SVP law model is entrenched with a law-psychiatry interface in which 
the modern treatment of sex offenders operates via a modal logic that 
presumes them a dangerous and bad people due to mental disease. A 
commentator has referred to such a model as a form of “desert-disease 
jurisprudence” in the way the law reacts to dangerous people.45 One who 
commits a criminal offense normally bears responsibility unless she is 
not competent, in which case, she would not deserve punishment.
46
 But 
those with a severe mental disorder are treated differently in the disease 
model since they were not acting rationally or autonomously.
47
 More 
specifically, the SVP law model represents gap-filling between desert 
and disease in which normal responsibility rules for criminal versus civil 
control are blurred.
48
 This desert-disease model for sexual transgression, 
nonetheless, does not operate to conceptualize offenders as sympathetic 
or less culpable.
49
 The special laws regard sexual deviance as caused by 
some degree of volitional, rather than merely cognitive disorder, such 
 
40. Petrunik et al., supra note 35, at 111. 
41. Erickson, supra note 25, at 115. 
42. Id. See generally Hamilton, supra note 33, at 720–34. 
43. Petrunik et al., supra note 35, at 111; see also Steven K. Erickson & Michael J. 
Vitacco, Predators and Punishment, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (2012). It has 
been argued that regarding psychopathy and criminal responsibility, “[d]ating back to the 
moral psychiatry movement, those individuals who routinely displayed a lack of respect 
for legal rules and social norms without additional evidence of overt mental illness have 
posed a dilemma for legal scholars and moral philosophers.” Id. (citation omitted). 
44. Petrunik et al., supra note 35, at 111. 
45. Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 892 (2011) (citation omitted). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 952–53. 
49. Id. at 958. 
7
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that the existence of the mental disorder is typically conceived not as a 
mitigating factor; rather, it is usually considered aggravating in nature.
50
 
These cognitive plus volitional impairments substantiate a presumption 
of risk of future dangerousness and, in turn, are used by officials to 
justify segregation and containment of sex offenders.
51
 The SVP law 
model of medicalizing social control here also assumes a homogeneous 
class of sexual predators in which sexual deviance derives from a mental 
disorder—i.e., the disease aspect.52 As others have recognized, this “one 
size fits all” mentality seems to underlie criminal justice officials’ efforts 
to control sex offenders.
53
 
In sum, management of the sex offender population via SVP laws 
currently draws on a desert-disease perspective. One may wonder, then, 
about the historical explanation for these policies as uniquely applied to 
sex-based offending. It appears likely that SVP laws and the 
accompanying law-psychiatry fusion have been influenced by the fact 
that, for the last century, mental health professionals have recognized 
sexual deviance as a form of mental illness.
54
 Today, disorders of sexual 
appetite are included in the authoritative treatise of the DSM, currently 
under its rubric of paraphilias. The DSM, a categorical classification 
system for mental disorders, is the product of an authoritative 
institution—the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”). 
 
 
 
 
50. Peggy Heil & Dominique Simons, Multiple Paraphilias: Prevalence, Etiology, 
Assessment, and Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND 
TREATMENT 527, 559 (D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue eds., 2d ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter cited individually by author and title]. “Agents who are unable to conform 
their conduct to the requirements of the criminal law due to mental defects are excused in 
many jurisdictions based on the notion that responsibility requires the ability of 
conscious, goal-directed acts.” Erickson & Vitacco, supra note 43, at 3. 
51. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365. 
52. Peggy Heil & Dominique Simons, Multiple Paraphilias: Prevalence, Etiology, 
Assessment, and Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND 
TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 558. 
53. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 361. The authors suggest the plethora of sex 
offense-based legislation “appears to have been premised on the false assumption that 
those regularly or habitually deviating from sexual norms belong to a relatively 
homogeneous offender class, that all members of the class are potentially dangerous, and 
that they all need the same sort of legal control.” Id. at 365 (citation omitted). 
54. Peggy Heil & Dominique Simons, Multiple Paraphilias: Prevalence, Etiology, 
Assessment, and Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND 
TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 533. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
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B. The Law-Psychiatry Interface 
 
As a general matter, the APA has found a powerful tool in its 
diagnostic manual. The DSM is known as the “bible” of psychiatry and 
is widely influential across professional disciplines. Through the 
acculturation of the DSM, the APA virtually appropriated the field of 
mental health.
55
 While purportedly based on scientific principles, the 
DSM is, at its core, a political document; the APA is a professional 
organization that clearly came to understand its ability to assert its power 
in the broader world.
56
 This is true even for matters otherwise reserved to 
legal professionals. A particularly relevant strategy was employed when 
the institution adopted the nomenclature of “mental disorder,” which 
allowed the APA to broaden the DSM’s coverage and the institution’s 
influence in the law enormously. 
 
When psychiatry turned away from the term “mental 
illness” to the expansive “mental disorder,” it opened a 
Pandora’s Box whereby almost any behavior can be 
deemed an affliction of the mind–and used by law to 
meet its own political ends. If law is a vehicle in which 
political ideas are executed . . . psychiatry has 
unwittingly given law the means to achieve politically 
efficient ends for dealing with many socially and 
politically difficult problems.
57
 
 
The APA has, since the adoption of the broader genus offered by 
the “mental disorder” terminology, continued to expand its coverage. 
The DSM originally listed 106 mental disorders in its first edition in 
1952.
58
 The most current edition, the DSM-IV-TR, lists over 250 
 
55. Owen Whooley, Diagnostic Ambivalence: Psychiatric Workarounds and the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 SOC. MENTAL ILLNESS 452, 
453 (2010); see also Warren A. Kinghorn, Whose Disorder?: A Constructive 
MacIntyrean Critique of Psychiatric Nosology, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 187, 194 (2011) 
(asserting that “the DSM project cloaks the will to power in therapeutic veil”). 
56. See generally Christopher Cotton & John W. Ridings, Getting Out/Getting In: 
The DSM, Political Activism, and the Social Construction of Mental Disorders, 9 SOC. 
WORK MENTAL HEALTH 181, 181-92 (2011) (documenting APA’s removing 
homosexuality from DSM in 1973 due to political pressure). 
57. Erickson, supra note 25, at 73. 
58. Id. at 77 n.39. 
9
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disorders.
59
 Conceivably, the APA can attempt to encompass virtually 
any mental phenomenon within the DSM’s taxonomy. With its creation 
and maintenance of the DSM, the APA now wields enormous power 
over any person or institution, including the law, willing to be governed 
by its epistemology and its nosology.
60
 
The APA has asserted its dominion in the criminal justice arena, 
more specifically, in adjudging deviance as a mental health issue. In 
propagating and monopolizing its classification system for psychiatry, 
the APA discovered that “any behavior that produced discomfort or 
socially undesirable behavior could be asserted as representing a 
disordered psyche irrespective of biological evidence.”61 Regarding 
sexual deviance and paraphilias, as cases in point, critics contend that the 
DSM categorizes them as mental disorders not because of “some mental 
degeneration of the brain but because such behavior is socially construed 
to be a process of a sick mind.”62 
 
C. The Paraphilic Disorders 
 
The term paraphilia was first introduced to American psychiatry by 
the work of Austrian sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, who in 1886 
penned Psychopathia Sexualis (Sexual Psychopathy), a work that 
continues to be a primary treatise in the sex offender treatment field.
63
 
The term paraphilia derives from the Greek words para meaning 
“beyond, amiss, altered” and philia meaning “love.”64 It has also been 
translated as “interest in perversion,” “love of the perverse,” and “love of 
something beyond normal.”65 The core of a paraphilia is an abnormal 
sexual interest.
66
 
 
 
59. Id. at 77. 
60. Id. at 98. 
61. Id. at 99. 
62. Id. at 114. 
63. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 361 n.14. 
64. Joel S. Milner et al., Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: 
THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 384. Another asserts para is 
Greek for deviation and philia means attraction. Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-5 Proposed 
Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Paraphilias: Tensions Between Diagnostic Validity and 
Forensic Utility, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 195, 195 (2011). 
65. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 3. 
66. David Thornton, Evidence Regarding the Need for a Diagnostic Category for a 
Coercive Paraphilia, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 411, 411 (2010). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
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The APA incorporated this label in the third edition of its taxonomy 
(DSM-III) in 1984.
67
 The initial DSM, published in 1952, considered 
sexual deviation a type of sociopathic personality disturbance,
 
while 
DSM-II in 1968 referred to sexual deviations.
68
 The DSM’s change from 
sexual deviation to paraphilia in DSM-III was purported to signify an 
“atheoretical, non-perjorative descriptor” to disassociate the mental 
health concept from the legalistic signifiers of deviance and perversion.
69
 
Notwithstanding that intent, in the law, paraphilias appear to have 
retained a vituperative connotation. For example, recent case law often 
represents paraphilias in terms of sexual deviance
70
 and perversion.
71
 
There are two general criteria for paraphilias. The first, Criterion A, 
requires “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or 
behaviors” generally involving: 1) nonhuman objects; 2) the suffering or 
humiliation of oneself or one’s partner; or, 3) children or other non-
consenting persons that occur over a period of at least six months.
72
 
Criterion B is met if “the fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors cause 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.”73 For those paraphilias involving 
nonconsenting victims (i.e., pedophilia, sexual sadism, voyeurism, 
exhibitionism, and frotteurism), Criterion B can alternatively be met if 
the person has acted on such urges.
74
 Per the DSM’s modal logic, 
paraphilias generally appear in early adolescence, are relatively stable, 
and are considered rather immutable.
75
 
 
 
67. American psychiatry initially noted the term paraphilia in the 1930s. Milner et 
al., supra note 64, at 384. 
68. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 8. 
69. Milner et al., supra note 64, at 384; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 93. 
70. E.g., Yancy v. Voss, No. SACV 06-356-JFW (CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43880, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011); United States v. Graham, 683 F. Supp. 2d 129, 
135 (D. Mass. 2010); Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM (CT), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 108797, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008); In re Johnson, No. A11-792, 2011 
Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *12 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011); In re Brady, No. 09-
09-00360-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4502, at *5 (Ct. App. June 16, 2011); People v. 
Williams, No. D046925, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4240, at *3 (Ct. App. May 16, 
2006); In re E.S.T., 854 A.2d 936, 939 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
71. E.g., United States v. Harris, 339 F. App’x 533, 535 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009); People 
v. Hill, No. A126089, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1621, at *12 (Ct. App. Mar. 4, 
2011); In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, ¶ 4, 758 N.W.2d 719, 721 (N.D. 2008). 
72. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.81, at 570. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Lippke, supra note 1, at 152. 
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The DSM includes eight specific paraphilias and a residual 
category. Comments in the DSM indicate that it is entirely appropriate 
for mental health professionals to diagnose an individual with more than 
one paraphilia. In the brief introductions of the individual paraphilias that 
follow, summary references to the historical origin of their names 
highlight their cultural roots. More importantly, the descriptions should 
make evident why the paraphilias as mental disorders are considered 
commensurate with sex-based crimes. 
Pedophilia is the most commonly studied and discussed paraphilia 
in clinical and forensic literature.
76
 The etymology of pedophile is lover 
of children.
77
 The appellation derives from the Greek words pedeiktos for 
child and philia for love.
78
 The DSM criterion specific for pedophilia 
refers to “intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors 
involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (generally 
age [thirteen] years or younger).”79 
Frotteurism derives from the French verb frotter, which does not 
have a sexual connotation per se but means the act of rubbing.
80
 In the 
DSM, it is described as sexually arousing fantasies or behaviors 
involving “touching and rubbing against a nonconsenting person.”81 
Frotteurism is a more recent addition to DSM’s paraphilias, introduced in 
1984.
82
 
Exhibitionism involves “exposing one’s genitals to an unsuspecting 
stranger,”83 while voyeurism regards the “act of observing an 
unsuspecting person who is naked, in the process of disrobing, or 
engaging in sexual activity.”84 Another paraphilia is fetishism, which is 
 
76. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 46; Michael C. Seto, Pedophilia: Psychopathology 
and Theory, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 
50, at 164. 
77. STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES: PATTERNS AND 
BEHAVIORS 110 (3d ed. 2009). 
78. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 45. 
79. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.2, at 571. The DSM pedophilia has another 
age specifier in which the individual diagnosed be at least 16 years and more than five 
years older than the child of interest. 
80. Patrick Lussier & Lyne Piché, Frotteurism: Psychopathology and Theory, in 
SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 145. 
81. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.89, at 570. (positing this common scenario: 
“He rubs his genitals against the victim’s thighs and buttocks or fondles her genitalia or 
breasts with his hands.”). 
82. Niklas Langström, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Exhibitionism, Voyeurism, 
and Frotteurism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 317, 320–21 (2010). 
83. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.4, at 569. 
84. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.82, at 559. 
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derived from the Portugese feitiço, meaning artificial.
85
 In the DSM, it 
includes sexual arousal to “nonliving objects.”86 The DSM has a separate 
category for transvestic fetishism, more specifically referring to cross-
dressing, which the commentary limits to applying only to heterosexual 
males.
87
 
Sexual sadism was coined by the same Austrian psychiatrist 
responsible for introducing the ideology of paraphilia to the American 
profession.
88
 Krafft-Ebing based the term on the licentious sexual 
behaviors of the Marquis de Sade.
89
 The DSM describes the sexual 
sadistic disorder as “acts (real, not simulated) in which the . . . 
psychological or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim 
[is sexually exciting to the person].”90 
Krafft-Ebing also created the term masochism, naming it after the 
author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch who wrote erotic novels in the late 
1800s, such as the celebrated Venus in Furs about a domineering woman 
torturing and subjugating the male hero.
91
 In the DSM, sexual 
masochism includes the “act (real, not simulated) of being humiliated, 
beaten, bound, or otherwise made to suffer.”92 
 
85. Jean-Luc Nancy & Thomas C. Platt, The Two Secrets of the Fetish, 31 
DIACRITICS 3, 4 (2001). 
86. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.81, at 560-70. Studies show the most common 
objects for fetishists are female underwear, feet-related objects (boots, shoes, socks), and 
leather. Martin P. Kafka, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Fetishism, 39 ARCHIVES 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 357, 360 (2010). 
87. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.3, at 574-75. 
88. Pamela M. Yates et al., Sexual Sadism: Psychopathology and Theory, in 
SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 213. 
89. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 169. 
90. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.84, at 573-74 (sadists’ desired responses are 
obedience, submission, humiliation, fear, and terror.) AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 167. 
For sexual sadists, the suffering is sexually arousing, not the infliction of pain. Id. The 
DSM offers examples: 
 
Sadistic fantasies or acts may involve activities that indicate the 
dominance of the person over the victim (e.g., forcing the victim to 
crawl or keeping the victim in a cage). They may also involve 
restraint, blindfolding, paddling, spanking, whipping, pinching, 
beating, burning, electrical shocks, rape, cutting, stabbing, 
strangulation, torture, mutilation, or killing. 
 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.84, at 573. 
91. Mary Jane Heron & William J. Herron, Meanings of Sadism and Masochism, 50 
PSYCHOL. REP. 199, 199 (1982). 
92. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.83, at 573. 
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Finally, there is a residual category. Paraphilia not otherwise 
specified (“paraphilia NOS”) is a diagnosis reserved for what might 
otherwise qualify as a paraphilia by virtue of the general criteria, but fails 
sufficiently to meet the standards for any of the eight specific categories. 
The DSM expresses that “[e]xamples include, but are not limited to, 
telephone scatologia (obscene phone calls), necrophilia (corpses), 
partialism (exclusive focus on part of body), zoophilia (animals), 
coprophilia (feces), klismaphilia (enemas), and urophilia (urine).”93 This 
residual category of paraphilia NOS was introduced to the DSM in 
1987.
94
 Professionals refer to paraphilia NOS as a wastebasket
95
 or a 
catchall category.
96
 Some sex offender treatment experts have identified 
more than fifty paraphilias in the NOS category in the literature,
97
 while 
others allege hundreds have been identified.
98
 
The uses of paraphilia NOS which have garnered the most debate in 
the sexual offender treatment community, and in the courts, involve what 
is commonly referred to as “paraphilia NOS-nonconsent” in two forms. 
One is commonly described in terms of rape paraphilia, and the other is 
known as hebephilia, which involves sexual interest in pubescent or 
postpubescent children.
99
 The explanation for these two is based on the 
fact that paraphilia NOS is a residual category with no criteria of its 
own.
100
 Thus, the natural reference point is the general criteria of the 
paraphilias as a nosological category. Criterion A is the most relevant 
one, which includes a subcategory alternative of sexual interest or 
 
93. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.9, at 576. 
94. John Matthew Fabian, Diagnosing and Litigating Hebephilia in Sexually 
Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496, 
498 (2011) [hereinafter Fabian, Diagnosing and Litigating]. 
95. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195. 
96. United States v. Caporale, No. 5:08-HC-2037-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
55794, at *1, *7 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2012); Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM 
(CT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008); Prentky et al., 
supra note 27, at 366. 
97. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 362 (conceding likely many others). 
98. E.g., In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 572 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); J. Paul 
Fedoroff, Forensic and Diagnostic Concerns Arising from the Proposed DSM-5 Criteria 
for Sexual Paraphilic Disorder, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 238, 240 (2011); 
Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually 
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 445 (2008) 
(noting that famous sexologist John Money identified and named over 100 deviant sexual 
interests); Milner et al., supra note 64, at 390 (noting some are subtypes of existing 
paraphilias). 
99. Fabian, Diagnosing and Litigating, supra note 94, at 497. 
100. Id. at 499. 
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behavior regarding nonconsenting persons. A rape victim by definition 
was not consenting and, in hebephilia, a pubescent or postpubescent 
youth under the age of sixteen generally cannot legally consent to sexual 
contact. 
 
D. The Law and Paraphilias 
 
Case law references to DSM paraphilia diagnoses are legion. 
Overall, judicial curiosity in understanding the meaning of paraphilias is 
evident in the frequent exercise in judicial opinions of describing them in 
layman’s terms. Often the portrayal of the paraphilias generally are in 
terms of sexual deviance and perversion.
101
 In addition, judicial opinions 
use normative descriptions such as abnormal arousal.
102
 Similarly, 
decisions concerning the length of sentences suggest abnormal sexual 
preference
103
 and disorder of sexual appetite.
104
 As another specific 
example, a state expert in one case referred to paraphilia as “odd sexual 
behavior in general.”105 The expert went on to explain that “[a]ny oddity, 
any peculiarity of a sexual object, [or any] sexual activity with that 
object . . . [is] love of the different.”106 In a prosecution on child 
molestation charges, a state expert described paraphilia as the preferred 
way of sexual gratification that is different from the “normal male/male, 
female/female, male/female sexual interacting or courting kind of 
behavior.”107 
Numerous cases mention specific paraphilias. Pedophilia, rape 
paraphilia, and hebephilia references are evaluated in detail below. Still, 
it is noted that opinions cite diagnoses of sexual masochism,
108
 
 
101. See supra notes 71-72 and cases cited therein. 
102. In re Williams, 264 P.3d at 572; see also United States v. Graham, 683 F. 
Supp. 2d 129, 135 (D. Mass. 2010) (citation omitted) (asserting that paraphilias are “not 
within the realm of what are considered and defined as normal or appropriate sexual 
behavior”). 
103. United States v. Pritchard, 392 F. App’x 433, 435 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010). 
104. Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 4326-05, 1918 EDA 2006, 1919 
EDA 2006, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 285, at *12 (Aug. 16, 2006). 
105. People v. Seja, F059924, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5474, at *4 (Ct. App. 
July 22, 2011). 
106. Id. 
107. People v. Hill, No. A126089, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1621, at *8-9 
(Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011). The court condoned such evidence as relevant to the defendant’s 
mental state at the time of the crime. Id. at *41. 
108. Paulos v. Ludeman, No. A10-1634, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 185, at *4 (Ct. 
App. Mar. 1, 2011); In re Brian J., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246, 256 (Ct. App. 2007); Medley v. 
15
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frotteurism,
109
 fetishism,
110
 exhibitionism,
111
 and voyeurism.
112
 Cases 
mention diagnoses of sexual sadism,
113
 while others used the phraseology 
of atypical paraphilia with sadistic features
114
 or paraphilia with sadistic 
features.
115
 Although infrequent, opinions mention diagnoses of some 
other diagnoses linking to the NOS genre, including telephone 
scatalogia,
116
 zoophilia,
117
 urophilia,
118
 klismaphilia,
119
 and partialism.
120
 
The mental diseases of sexual deviance matter for a host of issues in 
criminal law, such as insanity, competency, bail, sentencing, and 
parole.
121
 They also clearly dominate legal decisions to civilly commit 
 
Ludeman, No. A07-97, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 705, at *5 (Ct. App. July 10, 
2007); In re Kapprelian, 168 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Armstrong, 
152 Ohio App. 3d 579, 2003-Ohio-2154, 789 N.E.2d 657, at ¶ 27 (9th Dist. Lorain Cnty. 
2003). 
109. Bonior v. Conerly, 416 F. App’x 475, 476 (6th Cir. 2010); People v. Towne, 
No. H033465, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1602, at *5-6 (Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2011); In 
re Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶ 3, 777 N.W.2d 62, 63 (N.D. 2010). 
110. E.g., In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶ 3, 787 N.W.2d 752, 754 (2010); In re 
R.L.C., No. A-0941-07T2, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpib. LEXIS 2451, at *6 (App. Div. Sept. 
30, 2009); State v. Prust, 2004 WI App 68, ¶ 3, 271 Wis. 2d 818, 677 N.W.2d 732 (Ct. 
App. 2004); M.V.M. v. Tartalia, No. 2588-9-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1161, at *4 (Ct. 
App. June 1, 2001). 
111. Laxton v. Bartow, 421 F.3d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 2005); Towne, 2011 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 1602, at *5; People v. Calderon, No. B206734, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1427, at *9 (Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009); In re O.S., 763 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Neb. 
2009). 
112. Laxton, 421 F.3d at 567. 
113. Litmon v. Flores, No. C 03-03996 RMW (PR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58545, 
at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2008); In re Sugden, 2010 WI App 166, ¶ 6, 30 Wis. 2d 628, 
795 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2010). 
114. Maimon v. Belleque, No. 06-1100-PA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44064, at *4 
(D. Or. June 15, 2007). 
115. Ehler v. Or. Bd. of Parole, No. 08-483-KI, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63751, at 
*1–2 (D. Or. July 24, 2009); In re Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). 
116. In re Henson, 97 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Maybrey, No. 
01C01-9703-CC-00117, 1998 WL 161144, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 1998); State 
v. George, No. 01C01-9512-CC-00407, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 250, at *1, *7 
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 13, 1997). 
117. In re Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶ 3, 777 N.W.2d 62, 63 (2010); In re Grinstead, 
No. 09-07-00412-CV, 2008 WL 5501164, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2009); People v. 
Grant, No. A 092910, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3417, at *11 (Ct. App. Mar. 5, 
2002). 
118. Fair v. State, 161 P.3d 466, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
119. People v. Hubbart, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 498 (Ct. App. 2001). 
120. People v. Martinez, No. D055776, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2887, at *3 
(Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2011); People v. Wright, No. C057457, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 2325, at *3 (Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2009). 
121. See infra notes 8-21 and accompanying text. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
ADJUDICATING SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE 7/26/2013 4:32 PM 
552 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
sex offenders. Notably, the desert-disease model and the APA’s 
influence via the DSM are especially evident in the sexual predator civil 
commitment regime.
122
 Twenty states and the federal government 
statutorily permit the indefinite commitment of sexually violent 
offenders to secure psychiatric facilities—purportedly for treatment and 
potential cure.
123
 A recent survey counted at least 3500 individuals 
currently committed or detained under such laws in those jurisdictions 
that responded.
124
 In some states, approximately five percent of sex 
offenders about to be released upon serving their sentences are civilly 
committed.
125
 Significantly, such detention, though extreme in nature, is 
external to the normal criminal adjudication and sentencing system for 
criminal offenses.
126
 Those committed are rarely ever released.
127
 
The typical sexual offender civil commitment statute requires three 
elements: (1) a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense; and, (2) a 
mental disorder or disability (3) causing the individual significant 
difficulty in controlling recidivist behavior.
128
 The second element is the 
most relevant to paraphilias. Critics contend that the courts have been 
“deliberately vague” in defining mental disorder and permitting “far too 
much latitude and inconsistency.”129 Notwithstanding such displeasure, 
 
122. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 361 (“The growth of sexually violent person 
commitment laws seems premised on the idea that by forcing a connection between the 
individual defendant and the treatment facility and by then supervising that connection 
for a reasonable time period, the criminal justice system can promote treatment.”). 
123. Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention, 
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 975-76 (2011) (citation omitted). 
124. REBECCA JACKSON ET AL., SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL 
COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 2011 (2011), available at 
http://www.soccpn.org/images/SOCCPN_Annual_Survey_2011_revised_1_.pdf. 
125. Richard W. Elwood et al., Diagnostic and Risk Profiles of Men Detained 
under Wisconsin’s Sexually Violent Person Law, 54 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & 
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (2010) (indicating about 4% referred to commitment in 
Wisconsin); Jennifer E. Schneider, A Review of Research Findings Related to the Civil 
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 463, 465 (2008) (noting 3.3%–
6.4% annually in Minnesota from 1991-1999). 
126. See genrally Elwood et al., supra note 125, at 188. 
127. Schneider, supra note 125, at 479. 
128. See also Allen Frances et al., Defining Mental Disorder When it Really 
Counts: DSM-IV-TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 375, 377 
(2008); Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365. 
129. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Normative Versus Consequential Ethics in Sexually 
Violent Predator Laws: An Ethics Conundrum for Psychiatry, 38 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 386, 390 (2010); see also Frances et al., supra note 128, at 376–77; 
Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360 (“The problem of translation is amplified in the SVP 
context because the legal categories and thresholds are themselves poorly defined, in 
large measure because of the lack of clarity about the normative values underlying these 
17
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the Supreme Court considered the second element for purposes of sex 
offender civil commitment in the case of Kansas v. Hendricks.
130
 There, 
the state sought to commit the defendant based on a long history of 
sexually abusing children and a diagnosis of pedophilia.
131
 The lower 
court ruled that the state’s commitment statute, which used the 
terminology “mental abnormality” for the second element, was 
insufficiently vague for due process purposes.
132
 The Supreme Court 
reversed, ruling that even though the Court’s previous discussion of a 
qualifying disorder for civil commitment referred to it as a “mental 
illness,” such terminology was not intended as having any “talismanic 
significance” and the Court had “never required state legislatures to 
adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting [a] civil commitment 
[law].”133 Instead, legislatures retain much freedom in crafting terms that 
have legal meaning.
134
 The Hendricks Court then expressly recognized 
that a diagnosis of pedophilia was a sufficient diagnosis for the purpose 
of sex offender civil commitment,
135
 thereby opening the door to the 
acceptance of other paraphilias as qualifying diagnoses. 
The strong influence of the paraphilias in committal proceedings is 
consistently shown by statistical analyses. Studies of those committed or 
detained in sexual offender commitment facilities indicate that the 
diagnosis of any paraphilia ranges from forty-six percent to ninety-eight 
percent.
136
 Pedophilia and paraphilia NOS are the most common 
disorders cited in civil commitment proceedings,
137
 with roughly half of 
those committed or detained being diagnosed with one or the other.
138
 
 
laws.”); Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365 (“That these statutes used inconsistent 
definitions of proscribed sexual behaviors is hardly surprising since the public, mental 
health professionals, and the legal profession hold such widely divergent views as to what 
defined a sexually dangerous person.”). 
130. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
131. Id. at 354. 
132. Id. at 356. 
133. Id. at 359. 
134. Id. Likely as a result of the ruling, the federal sex offender commitment statute 
enacted with the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006 delineates the second 
element in a manner potentially to cover all bases: “mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006). 
135. 521 U.S. at 360. 
136. Schneider, supra note 125, at 465, 467. 
137. Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SEX ABUSE 425, 427 (2007); Julia E. McLawsen et 
al., Civilly Committed Sex Offenders: A Description and Interstate Comparison of 
Populations, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 453, 453 (2012). 
138. Shan Jumper et al., Diagnostic Profiles of Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders 
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Researchers have also shown the salience of a paraphilia diagnosis for 
positive decisions to civilly commit.
139
 In a study of a large sample of 
individuals evaluated for commitment, bivariate results showed the 
factor with the highest correlation to a recommendation of commitment 
was a paraphilia NOS diagnosis, greater even than antisocial personality 
disorder.
140
 Pedophilia was also highly correlated and had a statistical 
effect (i.e., positive impact) greater even than the number of previous 
victims or the individual’s statement of intent to commit a new sex 
crime.
141
 A logistic regression analysis likewise found a significant 
impact on the likelihood of the assessor to recommend commitment: 
holding constant other variables of interest, a paraphilia NOS diagnosis 
raised the odds of being recommended for commitment by over 10,500% 
while a pedophilia diagnosis raised the odds over 4500%.
142
 These 
studies provide clear evidence of the role that diagnoses of sexual 
deviance play in imposing preventive detention. 
Likely an important reason that these disorders matter to legal 
decisions and are routinely used to justify long-term restrictions for both 
criminal law and civil commitment purposes is that the DSM 
conceptualizes paraphilias as a systemic issue within the individual. This 
conceptualization often appears in case law. Opinions often cite experts 
referring to the chronic nature of paraphilias.
143
 One expert made this 
assertion abundantly clear, describing paraphilia as “chronic, unremitting 
life-long deviant sexual behavior.”144 An expert in another case justified 
a current paraphilia diagnosis despite the defendant’s last sexual offense 
occurring sixteen years earlier, based, in part, on his history of offending 
 
in Illinois and Other Reporting Jurisdictions: What We Know So Far, 56 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 838, 838 (2012). 
139. Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually 
Violent Predators for Civil Commitment, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 618 (2006). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. Sexual sadism increased the odds of commitment recommendation 
85,500% but result not statistically significant because of the few cases with the 
diagnosis. Id. at 621-22. 
142. Id. 
143. E.g., United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (D. Mass. 2009); 
Orozco v. Ahlin, No. CV 08-5504 AHM (CT) 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at *18 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008); In re Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011); In re 
Brady, No. 09-09-00360-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4502, at *5, *17 (Ct. App. June 16, 
2011); In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 572 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Seymour, No. 
A115509, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 757, at *52 (Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2009). 
144. People v. Meyers, No. C042511, 2005 WL 1303553, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 
2, 2005). 
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prior to that conviction, analogizing the situation to “once an alcoholic, 
always an alcoholic.”145 Case opinions similarly contain descriptions of 
paraphilias in terms of addiction, such as an expert characterizing 
paraphilia as an addictive disorder,
146
 and in another, the witness 
indicated that pedophilia is a “lifelong problem, like an addiction.”147 
Other cases note that testifying experts denoted paraphilic conditions as 
evidently incurable,
148
 such as assuring that the disorder is one that 
“[would] not go away with time.”149 At the same time, some experts are 
noted as indicating that a paraphilic disorder can be treated and possibly 
controlled over the long term.
150
 
In sum, courts’ frequent utilization of the mental diseases of sexual 
deviance indicates that these diseases resonate in the law and that they 
impact legal decisions, with important consequences for individuals. To 
the extent these decisions drive adjudication, sentencing, parole, and 
commitment consequences, they also impact the use and expenditure of 
government resources. The next section considers various normative and 
empirical issues that test the law-psychiatry interface and questions the 
propriety of those results. 
 
 
 
 
 
145. Felix v. Hennessey, No. C 01-3138 WHA (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91926, 
at *4 (N.D. Ca. Aug. 11, 2010); see also Dunivan v. State, 247 S.W.3d 77, 78 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2008) (indicating most psychologists believe past behavior is best predictor of 
future behavior). 
146. Litmon v. Flores, No. C 03-03996 RMW (PR) Docket No. 45, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 58545, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2008). 
147. In re Brian J., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246, 257 (Ct. App. 2007). 
148. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1200 (11th Cir. 2010) (pedophilia); 
People v. Scott, No. F060923, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7648, at *7 (Ct. App. Oct. 
6, 2011) (paraphilia NOS-nonconsent); State v. Sugden, 2010 WI App 166, ¶ 61, 330 
Wis. 2d 628, 795 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2010) (paraphilia nonconsent); People v. 
Schmidt, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9490, at *25, *93 (Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2002) 
(sexual sadism). 
149. Dunivan, 247 S.W.3d at 78; see also People v. Meyers, No. C042511, 2005 
WL 1303553, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2005) (indicating that while rapes occurred 
years before, with no evidence of sexual activity while confined, paraphilia is “an 
extremely deep-seated medical disorder that is life-long”). 
150. E.g., Yancy v. Voss, No. SACV 06-356-JFW (CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43880, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011); In re Day, 342 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2011); People v. Seymour, No. A115509, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 757, at *53 (Ct. 
App. Jan. 28, 2009). 
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III. The Law-Paraphilia Divide: Normative and Empirical Challenges 
 
The gap-filling, desert-disease model of sex offender laws provides 
some utility to criminal justice officials in attempting to protect society 
from sexual predators. Still, the law-psychiatry interface and the 
translation between scientific and legal terms is a necessary yet 
potentially hazardous feat considering the substantial infringement on 
liberty and privacy that the laws inflict.
151
 Putting it bluntly, 
commentators writing about the “most critical problems that occur at the 
intersection of law and science in the (SVP) context,” note two general 
concerns, those being that “‘good science’ will be unrecognized or 
misunderstood by the law and that the pressures of the law will not only 
use but encourage ‘bad science.’ Both concerns are potential sources of 
injustice and . . . threaten the integrity of science and the law.”152 
 
A. Normophilia: Contrasting Sexual Deviance 
 
The DSM’s asserted vision of the paraphilic disorders contemplates 
psychosexual interest in unusual objects, activities, or situations. The 
paraphilias, then, are theoretically contrasted with its antonym: 
normophilia.
153
 A relevant inquiry is how to define normal sexual 
interests and behaviors and then to consider what value such an exercise 
has for society. It turns out that such categorization serves prevailing 
political and social interests by drawing import from psychiatry. Even 
though psychiatric diseases are intended to be based on scientific 
principles—rather than being prescriptive—the lynchpin of the sexual 
interest being an unusual one inherently involves also a normative 
inquiry. 
History has shown that all societies endeavor to normalize sexual 
preferences and to regulate the sexual behavior of their members.
154
 The 
definition of what is erotically normative and who decides, is, therefore, 
pivotal. In Western culture, the definitional role evolved from the 
nineteenth century’s religious model of sin to one drawing also on 
pathological criminality in the twentieth century.
155
 The particular 
strategy of control in the last few decades and into the twenty-first 
 
151. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 359–60. 
152. Id. at 357-58. 
153. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 1 (citation omitted). 
154. See Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 365. 
155. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 94. 
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century has involved defining any sexual interest considered deviant as 
pathognomonic, and hence symptomatic, of mental disease.
156
 As a 
result, the “equating of unusual sexual interests with psychiatric 
diagnoses has been used to justify the oppression of sexual minorities 
and to serve political agendas.”157 This explains the relevance of 
paraphilias in modern law. 
In anthropological terms, paraphilias provide an emic categorization 
for a Westernized method of situating normality and inflicting societal 
pressures, causing individuals who vary sexually from the norm to 
experience distress.
158
 But there are fundamental problems with this 
disease-based model. Psychiatrists have always had trouble with 
consistency in defining paraphilias or in distinguishing them from non-
paraphilic, or normal, sexual interests.
159
 What are considered deviant 
sexual interests vary cross-culturally and, within any culture, vacillate.
160
 
As typical sex practices change, “some paraphilias based upon a specific 
erotic interest may come and go as a function of historical realities.”161 
Even within any time frame or cultural base, there are thorny issues 
in differentiating what is normal as compared to abnormal; and further, 
what is abnormal and also deserving a pathologizing stigma.
162
 Often the 
basis for defining normality is related to procreative sex. Krafft-Ebing, 
on whose work the American psychiatric profession’s initial embrace of 
 
156. Id. at 92. 
157. Id. at 93. 
158. D.L. Davis & R.G. Whitten, The Cross-Cultural Study of Human Sexuality, 16 
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 69, 76 (1987). 
159. Charles Moser, Yet Another Paraphilia Definition Fails, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 483, 483 (2011). 
160. Dinesh Bhugra et al., Paraphilias Across Cultures: Contexts and 
Controversies, 47 J. SEX RES. 242, 242 (2010). 
 
Humans are sexual animals, but vary across culture in their 
propensity to use sex as a non-procreative and pleasurable activity. 
Sexual behaviors in the non-procreative tradition differ across 
partners; depend on the availability of partners, fantasies, and 
opportunities; and are influenced by cultural norms, mores or morals, 
religion, religious taboos, types of societies, and expectations of its 
members. 
 
Id. 
161. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 362. 
162. D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue, Introduction, in SEXUAL 
DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 2 (noting such 
decisions are value judgments). 
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paraphilias was based, considered any non-procreative activity as 
perverse. In his view, bestiality, fellation, cunnilingus, and 
homosexuality were perversions, while rape was not because it could 
result in pregnancy.
163
 In a similar vein, the DSM-II offered the 
following description for its diagnostic category of sexual deviations: 
 
This category is for individuals whose sexual interests 
are directed primarily toward objects other than people 
of the opposite sex, toward sexual acts not usually 
associated with coitus, or toward coitus performed under 
bizarre circumstances, as in necrophilia, pedophilia, 
sexual sadism, and fetishism.
164
 
 
These indicate some continued vestige in religiosity, though other 
references could be used to determine normalcy, such as statistical, 
cultural, or subjective measures.
165
 
Because of the value judgment underlying normality and the 
uncertainty of human sexuality, together the paraphilias are perhaps the 
most contested group in the DSM.
166
 A critic notes that the DSM’s vision 
of sexual normality is too simplistic, pathologizing behaviors or fantasies 
that historically are quite common.
167
 The DSM paraphilias appear to be 
based on an assumption that normal sex is about intimate bonding, yet 
historically, much sex involves coercive schemas and indulging power 
imbalances.
168
 For instance, sadistic and masochistic behaviors are fairly 
 
163. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 2. 
164. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS DSM-II, § 302, at 44 (2d ed. 1968). 
165. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 8; HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 77, at 13-18. 
166. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195. 
167. Andrew C. Hinderliter, Defining Paraphilia: Excluding Exclusion, 2 OPEN 
ACCESS J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 241, 253 (2010), available at 
http://forensicpsychologyunbound.ws/OAJFP/Volume_2__2010_files/Hinderliter%2020
10.pdf; see also Lippke, supra note 1, at 152. Surveys of male college students show 
many would rape a woman if assured of not being caught. See generally Mary P. Koss et 
al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization 
in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 162 (1987); Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 138 (1981); Neil M. Malamuth et al., Sexual Responsiveness of College Students 
to Rape Depictions: Inhibitory and Disinhibitory Effects, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 399 (1980). 
168. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 170 (observing sadomasochistic activities occur 
in “normal” lovemaking since dominance and aggression have social value); Hinderliter, 
supra note 167, at 255. 
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common
169
 and are ubiquitous themes in pornographic materials.
170
 
Empirical studies similarly show that interests and behaviors considered 
abnormal in the DSM paraphilias are prevalent among the public at 
large.
171
 For example, a survey of undergraduate men showed that 
ninety-five percent reported having at least one deviant fantasy and that 
sixty-three percent had engaged in at least one deviant behavior.
172
 
Similarly, in a community sample of men ages forty to seventy-nine, 
researchers found that sixty-two percent reported some degree of sexual 
arousal from at least one paraphilia-related stimulus while forty-four 
percent had engaged in at least one paraphilia-related sexual behavior.
173
 
Extrapolating to the prevalence in the general population, the authors of 
the latter study concluded that “[i]n view of this number, both mental and 
real-life sexual experiences that are currently commonly regarded as 
 
169. Richard B. Krueger, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Masochism, 39 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 346, 351 (2010) (indicating 1-5% of Americans engage in 
sexually masochistic or sadomasochistic behavior); Richard B. Krueger, The DSM 
Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Sadism, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 325, 326 (2010) 
[hereinafter Krueger, Sexual Sadism]. 
170. Pamela M. Yates et al., Sexual Sadism: Psychopathology and Theory, in 
SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 215; Ana 
J. Bridges et al., Aggression and Sexual Behavior in Best-Selling Pornography Videos: A 
Content Analysis Update, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1065, 1075 (2010) (finding 
eighty-eight percent of scenes in popular pornography videos include physical 
aggression--primarily spanking, gagging, slapping). 
171. Studies indicate a significant percentages of men in the community fantasize 
about coercive sexual encounters. WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, 
HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 179 (1979) (finding forced sexual encounters were 
among the most reported sexual fantasies across gender/sexualities); Virginia 
Greendlinger & Donn Byrne, Coercive Sexual Fantasies of College Men as Predictors of 
Self-Reported Likelihood of Rape and Overt Sexual Aggression, 23 J. SEX RES. 1, 5 
(1987) (finding nearly 54% of college men so fantasizing); A. B. Heilbrun & David T. 
Seif, Erotic Value of Female Distress in Sexually Explicit Photographs, 24 J. SEX RES. 
47, 53 (1988) (reporting fantasies depicting women bound and in distress); Neil M. 
Malamuth & James V.P. Check, Sexual Arousal to Rape Depictions: Individual 
Differences, 92 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 55, 59 (1983) (reporting fantasies involving 
victim’s pain). 
172. Kevin M. Williams et al., Inferring Sexually Deviant Behavior from 
Corresponding Fantasies: The Role of Personality and Pornography Consumption, 36 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 198, 205 (2009) (prevalence of fantasies were 62% sadism, 83% 
voyeurism, 72% frotteurism, 13% pedophilia, 68% sexual assault, while the percentages 
for sexually deviant behaviors were 22%, 18%, 44%, 5%, and 25%, respectively). 
173. Christopher Joseph Ahlers et al., How Unusual are the Contents of 
Paraphilias? Paraphilia-Associated Sexual Arousal Patterns in a Community-Based 
Sample of Men, 8 J. SEXUAL MED. 1362, 1366, 1369 (2011) (breaking down for the 
paraphilic-stimulus as fetishistic (24.5%), masochistic (18.5%), sadistic (24.8%), 
voyeuristic (38.7%), frotteuristic (15.0%), and pedophilic (10.4%)). 
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peculiar and exotic should lose their status as ‘rarities.’”174 
Others surmise that the paraphilias currently embodied in the DSM 
indicate that the authors have not considered the evolution of sexual 
mores.
175
 A diagnostic descriptor unique to pedophilia provides a specific 
example that the DSM has been resistant to societal change. The latest 
DSM (DSM-IV-TR)
176
 regards the sexual interest in prepubescent 
children and includes a parenthetical indicating a general description of 
children age thirteen and younger. Yet, the prepubescent nature of the 
child of interest is supposed to be at the heart of it being a disorder of 
sexual preference. Today, the age of thirteen does not truly represent the 
body shape, here being the degree of secondary sex characteristics, of 
prepubescence.
177
 Statistics show that pubescence now generally occurs 
much earlier.
178
 For this reason, commentators criticize the DSM’s vision 
of pedophilia as “using 1990s diagnostic criteria without employing 
additional knowledge derived from 21st-century science and specialized 
practice.”179 
Another issue with the modal assumption of chronicity is that the 
disorders of sexuality ignore the fact that an individual’s sexuality is 
malleable.
180
 Interestingly, while paraphilias presume that individuals 
with the particular sexual interests covered therein are deviant, those who 
lack sexual desire are also targeted in the DSM, just within other 
categories (such as sexual arousal disorder or hypoactive sexual desire 
disorder).
181
 In sum, there appears no logical explanation for why certain 
paraphilias have been specifically recognized while others have not.
182
 
Consider these examples: Why is fetishism involving nonliving objects 
 
174. Id. The percentages of those engaging in paraphilic activities included those 
related to fetishism (24.5%), masochistic (2.3%), sadistic (15.5%), voyeuristic (18.0%), 
frotteuristic (6.4%), and pedophilic (3.8%). Id. at 1366. 
175. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 362; see also Langström, supra note 82, at 320–21 
(reporting Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare in 2009 deleted the paraphilias 
of fetishism, sadomasochism, and transvestism from Swedish version of the World 
Health Organization’s ICD-10). 
176. DSM-5 was pending at the time of this article. DSM-5: The Future of 
Psychiatric Diagnosis, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited May 10, 2013). 
177. Robin J. Wilson et al., Pedophilia: An Evaluation of Diagnostic and Risk 
Prediction Methods, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 260, 271 (2011). 
178. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 205. 
179. Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 271. 
180. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195. 
181. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, §§ 302.71-.72, at 539, 543. 
182. Fedoroff, supra note 98, at 240; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 96. 
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listed when it may be a solitary activity? With the large market for 
pornography materials, is voyeurism necessarily deviant? Is sexual 
fantasy involving a thirteen-year-old necessarily indicative of a diseased 
mind? 
Notwithstanding the issue of what objects of interest are irregular, it 
is evident that fantasy and sexual interest are not always linked to actual 
sexual activity.
183
 A recent study comparing samples of undergraduate 
males with convicted child molesters showed the former had more 
fantasies overall and more with sadomasochistic themes, even after 
adjusting for the potential for the molester group to underreport because 
of offenders’ likelihood to provide biased responses in an attempt to 
provide socially desirable answers.
184
 Reviewing empirical literature 
generally, other authors realistically conclude the following: 
 
The idea that unusual or deviant sexual interests 
automatically lead to sexual offending or that all sexual 
offending refers directly to the presence of sexual 
deviant preferences is untenable (however invariably 
popular with (screen) writers). Numerous unusual sexual 
interests do not lead to offending behavior because they 
are directed towards objects (e.g. fetishism) or because 
people find other consenting adults to sexually interact 
with (e.g. sadomasochism). Interest in illegal sexual 
interactions (children or nonconsenting persons) can be 
found in a substantial part of the (male) population. The 
majority of them, however, never seem to act on these 
interests.
185
 
 
183. A Finnish study of men age 33–43 found the mean minimum age of preferred 
targets of sexual interest and fantasy was 24 years while the mean minimum age of actual 
sexual partners was around 34 years. Pekka Santtila et al., Child Sexual Interactions with 
other Children are Associated with Lower Preferred Age of Sexual Partners Including 
Sexual Interest in Children in Adulthood, 175 PSYCHIATRY RES. 154, 156 (2010) 
(acknowledging reasons results may not be generalizable). 
184. Georgianna C. Brain, A Comparison of the Nature and Prevalence of Sexual 
Fantasies Between Sex Offenders and Non-Offenders 24-5 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished 
M.S. thesis, Texas State University) (on file with Texas State University). 
185. Wineke Smid et al., Proxy Measures of Sexual Deviancy, in INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 172, 180 
(Douglas Peter Boer et al. eds., 2011); see also Jerome V. Baumgartner et al., Assessment 
of the Wilson Sex Fantasy Questionnaire Among Child Molesters and Nonsexual 
Forensic Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE 19, 25 (2002) (finding hospitalized child 
molesters did not score significantly different on scales of sexually deviant fantasies than 
college males and samples of those sexually deviant but not criminals). 
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The classification of any particular sexual interest or behavior as 
unusual, and therefore paraphilic, is not the only problematic issue. 
Whether the paraphilia group should even be in the DSM is itself 
controversial.
186
 A valid question, though left conspicuously unanswered 
by the APA, is: When does a certain sexual pleasure—even assuming it 
is unusual—become a mental disorder?187 The APA has not made clear 
how the paraphilias that are included are inherently dysfunctional to the 
individual other than the disabling consequences that may be imposed by 
societal or legal reactions.
188
 Experts note there is scant empirical 
evidence of any disease process that can explain the existence of the 
paraphilias listed in the DSM.
189
 Indeed, the paraphilias so listed are not 
based on objective or empirical evidence of disorder.
190
 To the contrary, 
studies exist that contradict the presence of any pathology or dysfunction 
that are otherwise deemed necessary to qualify as DSM mental 
disorders.
191
 It is notable that American psychiatry’s conceptualization 
may be unique in the world. The British Psychological Society issued a 
statement in 2011 critiquing the inclusion of paraphilias in the DSM: 
“We believe that classifying these problems as ‘illnesses’ misses the 
relational context of problems and the undeniable social causation of 
many such problems[, and] of particular concern are the subjective and 
socially normative aspects of sexual behavior.”192 Mental health experts 
around the world continue to express concern with the seeming 
unscientific basis for the DSM’s sexual disorders. Even with the 
impending newest edition, to be referred to as DSM-5 and to be finalized 
in 2013, the APA has especially chosen not to field test the paraphilia 
group.
193
 All of this strongly suggests that the strong focus on 
“normality,” while eschewing the pathological element, means that 
paraphilias are more of a value-laden social construct than primarily a 
medical or scientific concept.
194
 Together, the foregoing observations 
 
186. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 241. 
187. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 195. 
188. D. Richard Laws & William T. O’Donohue, Introduction, in SEXUAL 
DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, at 2. 
189. Erickson, supra note 25, at 114. 
190. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 94. 
191. Id. 
192. C. A. ALLAN, THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y, RESPONSE TO THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DSM-5 DEVELOPMENT 25 (2011), available at 
http://apps.bps.org.uk/_publicationfiles/consultation-responses/DSM-5%202011%20-
%20BPS%20response.pdf. 
193. Fedoroff, supra note 98, at 238. 
194. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 4. 
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may explain ambiguities in the diagnostic criteria underlying the DSM 
disorders of sexual deviance. 
 
B. Diagnostic Issues 
 
Diagnostic vagueness in the paraphilia classifications is concerning. 
Notably, there are no validated or standardized diagnostic instruments 
which are available for the paraphilias.
195
 Without clear boundaries, the 
paraphilia disorders cannot, then, even theoretically, distinguish 
adequately those with a mental disorder and those without.
196
 The 
frequency of comorbid diagnoses indicates the overlapping nature of the 
paraphilias
197
 and signifies vast heterogeneity within DSM disorders—
meaning that persons with quite different profiles can be assigned the 
same paraphilic diagnosis.
198
 It becomes understandable why studies of 
interrater reliability (degree of agreement among different raters) show 
extremely poor statistics for paraphilias.
199
 In an effort to explain this 
lack of reliability, a psychiatrist with experience as a member of the 
working groups that developed DSM-III-R and DSM-IV observes that 
 
[T]here is a natural tendency. . .to focus on making 
changes aimed at broadening the diagnostic umbrella of 
their assigned categories with the goal of increasing 
diagnostic coverage, i.e., reducing what they consider to 
be false negatives, an effort which inevitably comes at 
 
195. Jackson & Hess, supra note 137, at 427; Richard B. Krueger et al, Sexual and 
Other Axis I Diagnoses of 60 Males Arrested for Crimes Against Children Involving the 
Internet, 14 PRIMARY PSYCHIATRY 623 (2009). 
196. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 96. 
197. Graham Mellsop & Shailesh Kumar, Classification and Diagnosis in 
Psychiatry: The Emperor’s Clothes Provide Illusory Court Comfort, 14 PSYCHIATRY 
PSYCHOL. & L. 95, 97 (2007). 
198. Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 889 (2011). 
199. The relevant statistic is the kappa coefficient. When the diagnosis can lead to 
significant infringement on the liberty of the individual involved, a suggested kappa of at 
least .9 (i.e., ninety percent rater agreement) should be expected. Jill S. Levenson, 
Reliability of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Criteria in Florida, 28 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAV. 357, 363–64 (2004) (considering a kappa coefficient of .75 good, and 
citing prior studies with kappas of .30 sexual sadism, .36 paraphilia NOS, .47 
exhibitionism, .65 pedophilia); W.L. Marshall, Diagnostic Issues, Multiple Paraphilias, 
and Comorbid Disorders in Sexual Offenders: Their Incidence and Treatment, 12 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 16, 18 (2007) (reporting studies with kappas of .65 
pedophilia, .30 sexual sadism, .47 exhibitionism, .36 paraphilia NOS). 
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the cost of increasing false positives.
200
 
 
Part IV below develops the argument that the paraphilias, as 
scientific concepts, are a poor fit for important legal decisions as they 
have been reengineered to support the SVP law model that conflates sex 
crimes with mental disease. As a prerequisite for understanding such an 
argument, it is important to delineate how the vagueness in two 
diagnostic criteria of the paraphilia group has permitted mental health 
experts to substantiate affirmative diagnoses, despite significant 
reliability issues and the likelihood of false positives. 
  
1. Criterion A: Abnormal Sexual Arousal Pattern 
 
Criterion A generally concerns the individual’s unusual “fantasies, 
sexual urges, or behaviors.”201 Because behaviors are detached with the 
“or” designation, many assessors have decoupled behaviors from the 
sexually arousing fantasies and sexual urges. Many forensic evaluators 
are thereby making a DSM paraphilia diagnosis without providing valid 
evidence to justify the diagnosis. Instead, they infer from the criminal 
sexual behavior the existence in the offender of the requisite “deviant 
sexual arousal pattern (i.e., recurrent, intense, sexually arousing fantasies 
and urges) that is the defining feature of a paraphilia.”202 Such inference 
may be unjustified. The fact that one can sexually function during a rape, 
for example, “provides no specific information about what is going on in 
his mind vis-à-vis the focus of his sexual arousal pattern during the 
act.”203 Thus, the likelihood of false positives is high if the forensic 
examiner predicates the diagnosis on the mere commission of a criminal 
sexual offense without also establishing a causal link between the 
behavior and a paraphilic arousal pattern.
204
 
Evaluators compound any such errors if they disregard the 
possibility that sexual behaviors had some cause other than a sexual 
fantasy or mental disorder.
205
 Individual circumstances and experiences 
 
200. Michael B. First, DSM-5 Proposals for Paraphilias: Suggestions for Reducing 
False Positives Related to Use of Behavioral Manifestations, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 1239, 1239 (2010) (citation omitted). 
201. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, § 302.81, at 570. 
202. First & Halon, supra note 98, at 444. 
203. Id. at 446. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 445. 
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or cultural and social factors may drive behaviors.
206
 The offender may 
be acting out in a sexualized manner for other reasons, such as 
antisociality, alcohol-induced disinhibition, opportunity,
207
 or a medical 
condition (such as Alzheimer’s disease).208 
 
2. Criterion B: Significant Impairment 
 
Mental health examiners now often also capitalize on a wording 
glitch existing in Criterion B, at least for those paraphilias specifically 
involving nonconsenting persons (i.e., pedophilia, sexual sadism, 
voyeurism, exhibitionism, and frotteurism).
209
 For them, the DSM-IV-TR 
indicates that Criterion B can be met if the behavior, urges, or fantasies 
cause significant impairment, or, alternatively, if the person acted upon 
them.
210
 This appears to permit a diagnosis based on behavior alone, 
without also requiring that the urges cause the individual significant 
dysfunction or impairment. The Chair and Editor responsible for wording 
changes in the DSM-IV edition publicly acknowledge the problematic 
wording as simple errors that, in retrospect, the Chair and Editor have 
come to appreciate have contributed to misuse of the paraphilia 
section.
211
 Instead, there is a more simple explanation behind the wording 
in Criterion B, and it relates specifically to pedophilia. When the APA 
initially issued the DSM-IV (before the text revision), it did not include 
the alternative of acting on the urges for the nonconsenting-type 
 
206. Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 253, 294–95 (2011). 
207. First, supra note 200, at 1242-43; First & Halon, supra note 98, at 449; see 
also Smid et al., supra note 185, at 180 (indicating studies show a “majority of sex 
offenders do not seem to have an explicit preference for illegal sexual interactions”); 
Vernon L. Quinsey, Pragmatic and Darwinian Views of the Paraphilias, 41 ARCHIVES 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 217 (2011) (arguing that pedophilia is inapplicable if the sexual contact 
with a child resulted from a “long-term strategy for obtaining an adult partner or . . . 
misapprehension of age”). 
208. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 202; see also Drew A. Kingston et al., 
Comparing Indicators of Sexual Sadism as Predictors of Recidivism Among Adult Male 
Sexual Offenders, 78 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 574, 581 (2010) (regarding 
sexual sadism, the import is whether “violence is intended to cause physical suffering that 
is sexually arousing to the offender, as opposed to other possible motivations (e.g., 
gratuitous violence because the offender is angry at the victim)”). 
209. Allen Frances & Michael B. First, Hebephilia Is Not a Mental Disorder in 
DSM-IV-TR and Should Not Become One in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
78, 80 (2011). 
210. See id. 
211. Id. 
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paraphilias.
212
 Simply, Criterion B then required that the behavior, sexual 
urges, or fantasies cause significant distress or impairment to the 
individual.
213
 This quickly turned into public relations nightmare for the 
APA because it prevented an evaluator from diagnosing an individual 
with pedophilia if he was not distressed about his sexual interest in 
children.
214
 The concern had been that some egosyntonic individuals who 
act upon their pedophilic urges are not distressed.
215
 
Consequently, in the text revision (DSM-IV-TR), the authors 
modified the wording so that acting upon the sexual urges would be 
sufficient for Criterion B for pedophilia, though they made a broader 
extension as well as the other paraphilias involving nonconsenting 
victims.
216
 In their own defense, the Chair and Editor of DSM-IV-TR 
contend that they had not anticipated the development of SVP laws, the 
role paraphilias would play in legal proceedings, or the significant harm 
resulting to many so diagnosed.
217
 
Even diagnosticians who continue to incorporate the requirement of 
distress or impairment to adjudge Criterion B often conflate its existence 
with the criminal justice consequences that the individual suffered, such 
as his arrest or incarceration, as a result of committing sexual offenses.
218
 
Arguably, the DSM itself suggests this connection. At first, the DSM 
expresses that a “[p]araphilia must be distinguished from the 
nonpathological use of sexual fantasies, behaviors, or objects as a 
stimulus for sexual excitement in individuals without a [p]araphilia.”219 
But then it explores what may qualify as dysfunction: “Fantasies, 
behaviors, or objects are paraphilic only when they lead to clinically 
 
212. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 251. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 202 (“Some constituencies were outraged that 
these criteria seemed to give the ego-syntonic well-functioning paraphilic a free pass as 
far as disorder goes, even in such cases as the compulsive repetitive pedophile.”). 
216. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 80-81. 
217. Id. at 79-81. 
218. This is evident in case law. E.g., Sigman v. Rogers, No. 07-1383(DMC), 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71127, at *22 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2008) (finding social impairment since 
imprisoned twice); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 (D. Haw. 
2008) (noting impairment by being incarcerated thrice); People v. Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 
1016, 1026 (Ill. 2010) (finding impairment based on prior convictions); People v. 
Willmes, No. H034656, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9444, at *11 (Ct. App. Nov. 30, 
2010) (indicating repeated incarcerations caused impairment by keeping defendant from 
leading a normal life). 
219. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2. 
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significant distress or impairment (e.g., are obligatory, result in sexual 
dysfunction, require participation of nonconsenting individuals, lead to 
legal complications, interfere with social relationships).”220 
 
3. What Constitutes Paraphilia “Not Otherwise Specified”? 
 
There are additional diagnostic challenges in the enigma of the 
paraphilia NOS residual. The “ambiguity has led to the distressing 
situation of the defining of paraphilia NOS by the idiosyncratic, 
unreliable, and untrustworthy standard of ‘you know it when you see 
it.’”221 Its vagary is evident in many case opinions. In a notably oblique 
summary, an expert testified in a case in which the defendant was civilly 
committed that “[p]araphilia is a sexual disorder. Not otherwise specified 
means that I’m not able to be more specific.”222 In another case, the 
opinion described the expert as indicating that “NOS was a type of 
paraphilia that was nonspecific and was a term that was used to describe 
general inappropriate sexual impulsivity.”223 Rather defensively, another 
testifying expert averred that the “DSM can’t possibly list all of the 
different potential . . . paraphilic diagnosis that are present out there, 
there’s a multitude.”224 Conversely, the defense expert in another case 
represented the NOS residual in political ideology, asserting that it was 
“a way for the [DSM] authors to cover themselves in case a new sexual 
appetite develops.”225 Several experts testified that paraphilia NOS was a 
residual category for less frequently occurring paraphilias,
226
 a concept 
 
220. Id. (emphasis added). 
221. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 80. 
222. In re Grinstead, No. 09-07-00412-CV, 2008 WL 5501164, at *3 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Jan. 15, 2009); see also People v. Pederson, No. A115239, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 9962, at *16-17 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (noting expert testified NOS means no 
specific diagnosis exists within the DSM independently). 
223. People v. Bailey, 937 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
224. In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶ 4, 787 N.W.2d 752, 754 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (expert explaining DSM’s failure to include paraphilia NOS-nonconsent). 
225. Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. LEXIS 
285, at *12 (Aug. 16, 2006); see also People v. Hughes, No. H022186, 2003 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 6761, at *79 (Ct. App. July 11, 2003) (noting expert described NOS as 
any paraphilia that does not fit the specific categories). 
226. E.g., United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224 (D. Mass. 2009); In re 
Orozco, No. CV08-5504 AHM (CT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108797, at *25 (D. Cal. 
Dec. 3, 2008); In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *4 (Ct. App. 
Sept. 21, 2007); Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 2006 PA. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 285, at *9, 12 (Aug. 16, 2006). 
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recognized in the DSM.
227
 The chimera of such a diagnosis did not seem 
to trouble judges considering that many case opinions mentioned a 
diagnosis of paraphilia NOS generally, without further specifying the 
particular abnormal sexual interest.
228
 
Because of the lack of standards, assessors seem to not reserve 
paraphilia NOS just for unique or newly recognized sexual interests. 
Observers witnessed the unparsimonious lumping of disparate behaviors 
into a single paraphilia NOS diagnosis: 
 
Most professionals in this field have seen evaluators 
connect separate types of offenses (one rape and one 
report of targeted masturbation in prison) to establish a 
single paraphilia diagnosis, or an act and an inferred 
fantasy (one rape and past bondage games with a 
consenting girlfriend) to establish a paraphilia. If, 
however, even under the most rigorous scrutiny there is 
no paraphilia, this implies that there is no basis to infer 
sexually deviant fantasies, thoughts, or behaviors in the 
offender’s criminal or personal history. Instead, what is 
in the offender’s history is general criminality with a 
sexual crime contained within it.
229
 
 
The following is offered as another example: 
 
[E]valuators will take a Lewd and Lascivious act in the 
presence of a minor and a sexual assault on an adult 
many years later; connect the two and diagnose 
Paraphilia NOS (non-consent). Therefore, under the 
current conditions of sex offender screening, the acts 
 
227. But this view makes the use of paraphilia NOS for hebephilia problematic. See 
infra Part III.C. 
228. E.g., United States v. Roderick, No. 2:10-CR-741-DCN, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 81086, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2011); Jennings v. Rogers, No. 06-5025 (JLL), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36787, at *9 (D.N.J. May 2, 2008); In re Brady, No. 09-09-
00360-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4502, at *8, *13 (Ct. App. June 16, 2011); In re 
Grinstead, No. 09-07-004120CV, 2008 WL 5501164, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 
2009); People v. O’Shell, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 60 (Ct. App. 2009); In re Allison, 2005 WI 
App 1, ¶ 9, 277 Wis. 2d 873, 690 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 2004). 
229. Dean R. Cauley, The Diagnostic Issue of Antisocial Personality Disorder in 
Civil Commitment Proceedings: A Response to DeClue, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 475, 493 
(2007). 
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don’t even need to be necessarily similar in nature, but 
must merely have a non-consenting victim.
230
 
 
This type of aggregation was represented in a legal case where the state 
expert described a “plethora of sexual deviancy that comes together” for 
the diagnosis of paraphilia NOS, citing to sexual interactions with 
prepubescent children and animals, an aggressive sexual act with a 
nineteen-year-old, and acts involving masochism, frotteurism, and 
exhibitionism.
231
 
From a scientific perspective it should be obvious that “[t]o the 
extent that this category [of not otherwise specified] becomes a waste-
basket for sex offenders, it is taxonomically useless (i.e., it provides no 
discrimination).”232 Experts assert that, in practice, clinicians worryingly 
overuse paraphilia NOS.
233
 
 
C. Constructing Arousal to Teenagers as Deviant: Hebephilia 
 
The issues of what is normatively deviant and the lack of diagnostic 
specificity in the paraphilias have led to an emerging controversy in the 
forensic science field and the courts. This involves the use of a new 
category of paraphilia involving sexual interest or behaviors toward 
minors that are older or more sexually mature (physically) than the group 
currently covered by the DSM’s version of pedophilia. The prevailing 
moniker is hebephilia, a term constructed from the Greek word ephebos, 
meaning “one arrived at puberty.”234 
There is little consensus about hebephilia. Even those who advocate 
hebephilia as a recognized mental disorder, disagree about what level of 
sexual maturity is involved (e.g., early pubescence, pubescence, or 
postpubescence) or what numerical age group, if any, should be 
included. There is also disagreement among them as to whether it should 
best be addressed as an extension of pedophilia or in the paraphilia NOS 
 
230. Id. at 494. 
231. In re Grinstead, 2008 WL 5501164, at *3. 
232. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 367. 
233. Cauley, supra note 229, at 493–94 (“The recent over application of the 
Paraphilia NOS diagnosis in this field has reached the level where any two sexual 
offenses in the offender’s history, no matter what the nature of the individual acts, will 
result in an NOS diagnosis.”); Marshall, supra note 199, at 20. 
234. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 45. Alternative names are hebophilia, 
ephebophilia, phebophilia, and Lolita Syndrome. Id. 
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residual. The argument for the latter is that paraphilia NOS includes 
interest in nonconsenting persons and thereby hebephilia is covered since 
it involves persons who generally cannot legally consent. The paraphilas 
working group for the upcoming DSM-5 have vacillated on the proposed 
definition, though they are working with it as a change to pedophilia. 
Analogizing to pedophilia is problematic considering the 
prepubescence required by the former is vastly different in sexual 
maturity than pubescence. Pubescence can trigger normal sexual interest 
from a statistical perspective.
235
 As examples, normal desires can be 
triggered in these hypotheticals: 
 
Individuals who harbor unrealistic Romeo-and-Juliet 
visions of young love, individuals who routinely have 
access to and find themselves sexually stimulated by 
young females or males (e.g., junior high school 
teachers, priests), individuals attracted to “forbidden 
fruit” or preoccupied with sexual purity, individuals who 
are predatory and see young girls and boys as easily 
seduced and thus a target of opportunity hard to resist, 
and many others may be inclined in their fantasies and 
possibly their actions to prefer pubescent targets for their 
desires.
236
 
 
To the extent that a reason to find attraction to prepubescent children 
deviant as it does not foster procreative goals, it is noted that from a 
Darwinian perspective, attraction to pubescence could have reproductive 
value considering pubertal girls have the potential of many offspring in 
the future.
237
 
Hebephilia, therefore, violates a basic principle underlying the 
paraphilias. They were meant to apply only to that which is unusual or 
bizarre, and attraction to pubescent or postpubescent individuals is 
neither.
238
 There is much research that supports the conclusion that many 
nonoffending men are sexually attracted to pubescent individuals, 
indicating it is definitively within the range of normality.
239
 In addition, 
various studies show that many men in the community have sexual 
 
235. Id. 
236. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 206. 
237. Quinsey, supra note 207. 
238. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 83. 
239. Id. at 84. 
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fantasies or behaviors involving youth of various ages.
240
 
Critics likewise contend that there is scant research on whether 
sexual interest in pubescent or post-pubescent youth is pathological and 
question why it is supposedly so fundamentally deviant that it deserves 
stigmatic labeling and ostracization. A commentator has suggested that 
including hebephilia in the DSM is extremely premature from a scientific 
perspective, as a “full understanding of [hebephilia] would require 
consulting experts and research from psychology, sexology, evolutionary 
biology, ethology, anthropology, and sociology.”241 The commentator 
has gone on to suggest that 
 
The lack of research interest in pedohebephilia is 
breathtaking in light of the extreme societal concern over 
adults and adolescents who interact sexually with 
children, and considering that [five percent] or more of 
males (over [five] million adults and 600,000 teenagers 
in the U.S.) may be preferentially attracted to children.
242
 
 
 
 
240. See generally John Briere & Marsha Runtz, University Males’ Sexual Interest 
in Children: Predicting Potential Indices of “Pedophilia” in a Nonforensic Sample, 13 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 65 (1989) (surveying 193 male university students, finding 
nine percent reported fantasizing about sex with a young child, five percent masturbating 
to fantasies of sex with children, and seven percent likely to have sex with a child if 
assured they would not be caught or punished); Claude Crépault & Marcel Couture, 
Men’s Erotic Fantasies, 9 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 565 (1980) (sampling ninety-four 
men, finding sixty-two percent reported fantasizing about sexually initiating with a with a 
young girl and three percent with a young boy); Terrel L. Templeman & Ray D. Stinnett, 
Patterns of Sexual Arousal and History in a “Normal” Sample of Young Men, 20 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 137 (1991) (surveying sixty college men where five percent 
expressed an interest in sex with a girl under twelve); Mary Ellen Fromuth et al., Hidden 
Child Molestation: An Investigation of Adolescent Perpetrators in a Nonclinical Sample, 
6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 376, 379-80 (1991) (finding three percent of college men 
reported having a sexual experience with a child when they were age sixteen or over); 
T.P. Smith, Effects of the Child’s Relative Age Appearance and Attractiveness on 
Vulnerability to Pedosexual Interactions, U. MICROFILMS INT’L, 1993, at 54.(reporting 
three percent of sample of 183 male college students on condition of anonymity had 
sexual contact with a prepubescent girl age twelve or younger and eleven percent with a 
girl twelve to fifteen when they were over eighteen). 
241. Richard Kramer, APA Guidelines Ignored in Development of Diagnostic 
Criteria for Pedohebephilia, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 233, 233 (2011). 
242. Id. (citation omitted). The paraphilias subgroup ignores DSM research agenda 
development issues, including developmental issues concerning pedohebephilia since 
attraction to children develops during childhood. Id. 
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Despite hebephilia not yet being formally incorporated in the DSM, 
many mental health experts, as well as most courts in which it has been 
at issue, have already accepted it as a proper diagnosis. The confusion 
and lack of diagnostic criteria, however, are represented in the various 
definitions experts have given in legal proceedings. Case opinions show 
that mental health experts have described hebephilia as involving sexual 
interest in adolescents
243
 and, similarly, as involving sexual interest in 
“underage individuals though they are not considered children [such as 
adolescents].”244 However, other versions emphasize post-pubescence,245 
including interest in “post-pubescent adolescents, i.e., teenagers or 
minors having secondary . . . characteristics.”246 One depiction expressly 
tied it to a legal definition: the expert defined hebephilia as sexual 
interest in post-pubescent children below the age of consent.
247
 Still other 
accounts appear to ignore sexual maturity and are simply age-based, such 
as delineating hebephilia to include interest in children older than 
thirteen,
248
 children between thirteen to sixteen years of age,
249
 and, 
finally, “young teens to . . . about age [seventeen].”250 In sum, the 
definitions in case law are disparate, defining hebephilia in terms of stage 
of sexual maturity, age ranges, and legal age of consent. 
 
243. United States v. Graham, 683 F. Supp. 2d 129, 142 (D. Mass. 2010); United 
States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); State v. Rachel, 2010 WI 
App 60, ¶ 21, 324 Wis.2d 465, 782 N.W. 2d 443 (Ct. App. 2010); In re Ayers, No. 
37822-1-II, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 647, at *1 (Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010); In re Miller, 
No. 6-324 / 05-1453, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *3 (Ct. App. July 12, 2006); but see 
Donaghe v. State, No. 31144-5-II, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1943, at *6 (Ct. App. Aug. 3, 
2005) (analogizing hebephilia to pedophilia but involving adolescents). 
244. In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 330 (Kan. 2011). 
245. E.g., In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 2007 WL 1038894, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007); In re Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
246. United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (D. Haw. 2008). 
247. In re A.H.B., 898 A.2d 1027, 1030 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
248. In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *4 (Ct. App. 
Sept. 21, 2007). 
249. Commonwealth v. Connolly, No. 05-1059C, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 77, at 
*4 (Ct. App. Div. Feb. 3, 2006). In some cases experts testified that a hebephilia 
diagnosis applied even though the sexual activities with minors appeared consensual if 
not for their age. In re Navratil, 799 N.W.2d at 653 (Randall, J., dissenting) (calling it 
statutory rape with “women slightly younger”); In re Miller, No. 6-324 / 05-1453, 2006 
Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *4 (Ct. App. July 12, 2006) (noting expert characterizing it as 
defendant’s inability to resist an adolescent who approaches); Commonwealth v. 
Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (referring to defendant’s actions with 
14-year-old stepdaughter as being a sexual surrogate and situational). 
250. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 225 n.166 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(alteration in original). 
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In many cases, the expert linked the hebephilia diagnosis generally 
to paraphilia NOS.
251
 These included “paraphilia, underage males”252 or 
paraphilia NOS with post-pubescent boys.
253
 In a sentencing hearing in a 
case for child pornography, the diagnosis was quite specific: “Paraphilia 
NOS Attraction to [and] Viewing of Sexually Explicit Images of Post-
Pubescent Adolescent Females.”254 In another case the court added 
supervised release conditions based, in part, on the diagnosis of 
paraphilia NOS “involving pornography and teenage girls.”255 In a 
particularly strong advocacy for the significance of hebephilia, the expert 
asserted that it was causally related to the defendant’s past offending and 
to his likelihood of recidivism.
256
 
The proponents of hebephilia face strong opposition. Legal 
challenges to its use in court proceedings are considered in the next Part. 
Furthermore, certain mental health experts worry that the field of 
psychiatry loses credibility by asserting, for instance, that a nineteen-
year-old who prefers sex with a fourteen-year-old has a mental 
disorder
257
 or, regardless of an age difference, in treating attraction to a 
developed fourteen-year-old the same as attraction to a prepubescent ten-
year-old.
258
 Indeed, in many countries, including in Europe, an adult 
 
251. In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 330 (Kan. 2011) (paraphilia NOS with 
hebephilic tendencies with adolescents); In re Johnson, No. A11–792, 2011 Minn. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011); In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 
Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *3 (Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2007); In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-
06T2, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *4 (Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007); In re 
Miller, No. 6-324/05-1453, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *3 (Ct. App. July 12, 2006); 
see also In re M.N.A., No. A-4354-09T2, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3036, at *6 
(Ct. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2010) (involving expert who gave a plethora of NOS diagnoses, 
including depressive disorder NOS, impulse control disorder NOS, and personality 
disorder NOS). 
252. Berg v. Missouri, 342 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
253. Sigman v. Rogers, No. 07-1383(DCM), 2008 WL 4104447, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 
3 , 2008). 
254. Walker v. United States, No. 7:09-CV-90060, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108981, 
at *48 (M.D. Ga. May 24, 2010). 
255. United States v. Blauvelt, No. WDQ-08-0269, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87060, 
at *13 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2008). 
256. United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1151 (D. Haw. 2008). 
257. Richard Wollert & Elliot Cramer, Sampling Extreme Groups Invalidates 
Research on the Paraphilias: Implications for DSM-5 and Sex Offender Risk 
Assessments, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 554, 555 (2011); Richard Green, Hebephilia is a 
Mental Disorder?, SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT, http://www.sexual-offender-
treatment.org/2-2010_01.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
258. Howard Zonana, Sexual Disorders: New and Expanded Proposals for the 
DSM-5–Do We Need Them?, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 245, 248 (2011). 
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having voluntary sexual relations with a fourteen-year-old is legal.
259
 
These issues, along with the likelihood that most sex with pubescent 
teenagers, and much of it with younger children, is more opportunistic,
260
 
means a high probability of many false positive diagnoses of mental 
disorder.
261
 One commentator summarized the situation thusly: 
“Diagnosing hebephilic behavior as mental disorder brushes aside 
common patterns of psychosexual development, sidesteps cultural 
influences on sexuality, ignores historic precedents, insults much of 
Europe and elsewhere that legalizes sex with [fourteen] year olds, or 
younger, and attempts to insinuate psychiatry as an agent of social 
control.”262 
 
IV. Reframing Sex Crimes as Mental Disease 
 
The law’s utilization of psychiatric diagnoses in the application of 
policies to control those sexual offenders perceived as dangerous 
continues despite significant normative and scientific challenges. Is the 
charge true that psychiatry is being used as a “prop of legitimacy” for 
SVP laws?
263
 The desert-disease model has in some ways benefited the 
mental health field where it has resulted in a “cottage industry and 
generated two partisan advocacy expert camps” in providing forensic 
evaluations.
264
 The partisanship is related not only to the adversarial 
 
259. See generally Worldwide Ages of Consent, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/age-
of-consent.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). The age of consent in twenty European 
countries is under sixteen. Id.; Emily J. Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth 
Amendment Challenge to Classifying Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1208 (2011). 
260. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 204. “What would motivate a man who is 
attracted to adult women (i.e., gynephilic) to approach a young girl for sex?” Amy D. 
Lykins et al., Sexual Arousal to Female Children in Gynephilic Men, 22 SEXUAL ABUSE 
279, 280 (2010). Researchers studied 214 men referred to a Toronto sexual addiction 
center and classified as gynephilic. Id. at 282–85. While on average tests showed greatest 
arousal to adult females, there was also a significant response to pubescent, even 
prepubescent, females. Id. at 285. The authors find this of interest as nothing in their 
background suggested sexual interest other than to adult females. Id. The researchers 
conclude that results support the theory gynephilic men may molest girls as substitutes 
for their main preference. Id. at 287. 
261. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 204. 
262. Green, supra note 257. 
263. Eric S. Janus, Sexually Violent Predator Laws: Psychiatry in Service of a 
Morally Dubious Enterprise, 364 MED. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 50, 50 (2004). 
264. John Matthew Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators: The Ethical Application of 
Psychiatric Diagnoses in Partisan Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 82, 82 (2011) [hereinafter Fabian, 
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nature of the law but also to the vagary in applying the DSM’s criteria 
for paraphilias. Skeptics of the use of paraphilias in the law have charged 
that the “tolerance of the legal system for nonstandard and non-
authoritative diagnoses suggests strongly that the legal system’s reliance 
on diagnostic testimony is largely pretextual.”265 It serves their mutual 
interests by labeling sexual offenders as mentally ill and also dangerous, 
therefore deserving severe punishment and preventive detention. It could 
be that the DSM’s categorization provides clinicians and legal actors 
comfort by acknowledging that the diagnoses exist.
266
 Yet, as explained 
in this Article, it appears a false comfort considering the negative 
consequences to the defendants involved and the potential waste of 
governmental and treatment resources in the process. In sum, because the 
paraphilias are normatively questionable and scientifically unsound, they 
provide a poor fit for answering legal questions that intrude significantly 
upon civil rights. 
 
A. Pretextuality 
 
The previous section demonstrated that practitioners have employed 
much diagnostic flexibility with the DSM criteria in a manner that serves 
the desert-disease model for controlling sexual offenders. A crucial 
inquiry is whether the law-psychiatry interface here has become so 
entangled that bad science is going unrecognized in legal forums. A 
prominent critic of the use of the DSM’s unscientific paraphilias in SVP 
law decisions observes: “For reasons that were unanticipated just a few 
decades ago, the precise definitions of the paraphilias have become 
entwined with the attempt to prevent such harm to the public from the 
individuals illegally acting out certain paraphilic desires.”267 Despite 
significant flaws in the science underlying the designation of paraphilic 
disorders, two constituencies, at least, are incentivized to maintain their 
utility: criminal justice officials and forensic evaluators. The legal and 
forensic psychiatry disciplines have certainly allied in using the specter 
of mental disease to control sexually deviant offenders. But they have 
done so decidedly in favor of prosecutorial interests. Professionals 
 
Paraphilias and Predators]. 
265. Robert A. Prentky et al., Commentary: Muddy Diagnostic Waters in the SVP 
Courtroom, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 455, 457 (2008) [hereinafter Prentky et 
al., Muddy Diagnostic Waters]. 
266. Mellsop & Kumar, supra note 197, at 96. 
267. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 196. 
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engaged in the cross-disciplinary interface appear to have adopted a 
phenomenological approach that has devolved into what social scientists 
refer to as groupthink—that is, when a group’s desire for consensus 
supersedes any realistic consideration of alternative theories or a 
reevaluation of potential faults in its ideology.
268
 
Evidence of pretextuality in favor of prosecutorial interests is found 
in the conflation of sexual crimes with psychiatric illness by using 
criminal behavior as often the sole basis for a paraphilic diagnosis. 
“Enterprising” forensic evaluators now rely upon criminally offensive 
sexual behavior to fulfill both Criteria A (sexual preference) and B 
(dysfunction).
269
 These diagnostic loopholes inappropriately lead to the 
assignment of mental illness based primarily (or even solely) on repeated 
sexual offenses considering many paraphilic-type acts are crimes.
270
 In 
numerous case opinions, indeed, it often appears that the diagnosis for 
paraphilia was based on past criminal sexual behaviors alone.
271
 Multiple 
problems result from this conflation. In psychological terms, this 
represents what is empirically referred to as the logical fallacy of 
affirming the consequent—that is, using the sexual offense to assume the 
paraphilia (the antecedent).
272
 It seems illogical, too, that when a 
diagnosis is based on behavior, the behavior indicates a disorder even if 
it benefits the individual.
273
 Such diagnosis may not, therefore, represent 
any underlying pathology.
274
 The mere consequence that a sexual 
 
268. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1972). 
269. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 202; First, supra note 200, at 1240. 
270. Krueger, Sexual Sadism, supra note 169, at 341; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra 
note 39, at 98. 
271. E.g., People v. Seja, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5474, at *35 (Ct. App. 
July 22, 2011) (noting expert’s diagnosis supported by defendant’s prior crimes); In re 
Conley, No. 09-10-00383-C.V, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7877, at *4 (Ct. App. Sept. 29, 
2011) (state expert basing paraphilia NOS on defendant’s sexual offenses against non-
consenting adults); People v. Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 1016, 1026 (Ill. 2010) (relying on three 
sex offenses with non-consenting persons (teenagers) over five years); State v. Sugden, 
2010 WI App 166, ¶ 6, 330 Wis.2d 628, 795 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 2010) (relying on 
details of defendant’s rapes and sexual aggression toward wife); People v. Runge, 917 
N.E.2d 940, 949 (Ill. 2009) (basing sexual sadism on documented history of sexual 
transgressions); People v. Torres, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 100 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[d]efendant’s criminal history, according to both experts, demonstrates his 
paraphilia.”). 
272. First & Halon, supra note 98, at 446. 
273. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 94. 
274. Holly A. Miller et al., Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations: Empirical 
Evidence, Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 29, 39 (2005). 
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behavior is illegal or that it may be socially distasteful should 
forensically be irrelevant to the diagnostic evaluation.
275
 
This manipulation of the DSM criteria thereby transforms immoral, 
sexual conduct into mental disease.
276
 An example is when 
diagnosticians use the paraphilia NOS category based almost solely on 
the individual’s commission of multiple, yet disparate, sexual offenses. 
Here, the diagnostician merely amalgamates various sex crimes and 
infers a generic, wastebasket diagnosis. Such transformation has served 
the disease model, in that repeated, or even the threat thereof of future, 
behaviors becomes the disease component incorporated into SVP laws.
277
 
The potential for a slippery slope becomes apparent. Assuming virtually 
all victims of sexual crimes are non-consenting, any individual who 
commits more than one sex-based offense over six months apart, no 
matter how disparate the behaviors or the motives, could theoretically be 
diagnosed with paraphilia NOS.
278
 
Diagnostic criteria that presumes that a paraphilia cannot go into 
remission compounds these problems.
279
 Again, the diagnosis may not 
represent an underlying pathology but may be simply a descriptor of past 
behavior and, importantly, presumptively unchanging behavior.
280
 Any 
history of sex offenses, no matter how far in the past, is transformed into 
mental illness and assumed to be lifelong. This universal assumption of 
chronicity and the pretextuality of the paraphilias manifest most often in 
the diagnosis of mental disorder for child molesters and rapists. 
 
B. Child Molestation as Mental Disease 
 
Pedophilia is perhaps the most commonly known paraphilia and the 
one most likely to be recognized outside the mental health field. But this 
also makes the paraphilia of pedophilia an area where law, science, and 
common parlance collide. Often, the terms pedophile and child molester 
are used interchangeably,
281
 as are pedophilia and the behavior of child 
 
275. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 95. 
276. Erickson, supra note 25, at 92–109; see also Erickson & Vitacco, supra note 
43, at 8 (APA’s vision of mental disorder requires distress or disability; “mere social 
deviance [being] insufficient”). 
277. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 366. 
278. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 367. 
279. Miller et al., supra note 274, at 39. 
280. Id. 
281. HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 77, at 110. 
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molestation.
282
 This conflation of terms is problematic for various 
reasons. It makes the pedophilic disorder intrinsically indistinguishable 
from the crime.
283
 And the diagnosis loses its connection to professional 
skill and training. For instance, it has been suggested that virtually any 
layperson can make the forensic diagnosis of pedophilia, even if the 
diagnosis results in significant legal consequences: “Some legal experts 
have suggested that pedophilia is so behaviorally explicit that anyone 
could arrive at the diagnosis with an adequate record and a command of 
the English language.”284 
 
1. Issues of Reliability 
 
Merging behavior with a diagnosis of pedophilia has contributed to 
diagnostic flaws by ignoring the recurrent and intense sexual fantasies or 
urges required by the DSM’s criteria. Essentially, the disorder of 
pedophilia can fundamentally differ from child molestation in requiring a 
psychological propensity—that is, a sexuo-erotic preference for 
prepubescent children, whether acted upon or not.
285
 Hence, it is critical 
to reinforce the difference based on the sexual interest: those with 
pedophilia have the sexual fantasies preferentially involving sexually 
immature youth but may not molest them, while those who do sexually 
assault young children may not have such a preference and thereby 
 
282. United States v. Ardolf, 683 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 2012); Seto, supra note 
76, at 164; Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and its Net-Widening 
Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1693 (2012). 
283. Zonana, supra note 258, at 246. Some criminal statutes expressly use the 
terminology of pedophilia. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205A (2010) (imposing additional 
penalties for pedophile offenders); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-1 (2006) (codifying 
crime of “criminal pedophilia”). 
284. Miller et al., supra note 274, at 47; see United States v. Colin, 1:07-CR-512 
(GLS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91409, at *11–12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007) 
(acknowledging absence of a clinical diagnosis, but labeling defendant a pedophile based 
on defendant’s sexually-charged interactions with 12-year-old girls). 
285. AGGRAWAL, supra note 3, at 47; Jennifer Jason, Note, Beyond No-Man’s 
Land: Psychiatry’s Imprecision Revealed by its Critique of SVP Statutes as Applied to 
Pedophilia, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1340 (2010) (observing experts improperly focus on 
illegal behavior, already criminalized, and not assessing for sexual fantasies of pubescent 
children). The psychiatric “bible” for the international psychiatry community specifically 
requires the sexual preference to prepubertal or early puberty children. INTERNATIONAL 
STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. F65.4 (10th rev. 2010), available at 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en#/F60-F69. 
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should not be diagnosed as paraphilic.
286
 In simple terms, 
(diagnostically-confirmed) pedophiles and (behaviorally-substantiated) 
child molesters are not synonymous.
287
 Unfortunately, it is common 
practice in forensic settings to fail to distinguish ordinary criminals from 
those with pedophilia because the government is not proving the element 
of a pattern of preferential arousal to children.
288
 In one case, for 
instance, the expert diagnosed the defendant with pedophilia based on 
prior acts of sexual contact with children, as well as rape paraphilia for 
past acts of raping adult women, explaining the dual diagnoses just 
meant that defendant’s sexual interests were not exclusive.289 
Another empirical issue is that cause and effect are clouded by 
conflating pedophilia and child molestation.
290
 Logically, such a 
conflation is the result of circular reasoning. One who molests a child has 
pedophilia and vice versa. There is no way to empirically confirm or test 
such an imputed relationship. It is contended, too, that while child 
molestation is an immoral act, there is no medical evidence of it deriving 
from a mental deficiency; rather, it is a social construction that 
pedophilia is linked to a sick mind.
291
 These grievances may help explain 
why there is evidence that a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia does not 
adequately measure a deviant arousal pattern to pubescent children. 
Studies have shown that a DSM-based pedophilia diagnosis is not 
correlated with phallometric indications of deviant arousal to pubescent 
children.
292
 Nor is a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia correlated with sexual 
 
286. Joseph A. Camilleri & Vernon L. Quinsey, Pedophilia: Assessment and 
Treatment, in SEXUAL DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT, supra note 50, 
at 184; Marshall, supra note 199, at 20. 
287. See Kerry Sheldon & Dennis Howitt, Sexual Fantasy in Paedophile Offenders: 
Can Any Model Explain Satisfactorily New Findings from a Study of Internet and 
Contact Sexual Offenders?, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 137, 153 (2008) 
(finding in a small sample no association between fantasies with children and child 
molestation). 
288. Jason, supra note 285, at 1332. 
289. People v. Hooker, 968 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
290. Camilleri & Quinsey, supra note 286, at 184. 
291. HOLMES & HOLMES, supra note 77, at 30–45 (offering social learning, 
psychological, and sociobiological explanations for pedophilia); Fred S. Berlin, 
Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic Criteria in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
& L. 242, 243 (2011) (conceding that it is disingenuous to suggest pedophilia diagnosis in 
the DSM is not based in part on value judgment); Erickson, supra note 25, at 114. 
292. Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 268 (studying 130 convicted sex offenders 
against children assessed at a sexual behavior clinic in Ontario). The authors note the lack 
of a correlation “is puzzling, given that these would appear to be the two most common 
means of diagnosing this condition.” Id. at 270. 
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recidivism.
293
 Actually, a study using a regression analysis method 
indicates that a DSM diagnosis of pedophilia is not even a significant 
predictor for sexual recidivism.
294
 These results undermine the prevailing 
risk-based model presumption that a diagnosis of pedophilia is an 
appropriate proxy for risk assessment supporting legal decisions. Experts 
likewise note that multiple studies show such low statistics for the 
reliability and validity of DSM diagnoses of pedophilia that it should be 
seriously questioned and construed to hold limited utility for 
practitioners,
295
 and even more inappropriate for legal proceedings.
296
 
However, with the Supreme Court’s acceptance of pedophilia as a 
qualifying mental disorder in the Hendricks civil commitment case,
297
 
there appears little hope for legal challenges by counsel in a trial 
setting.
298
 
The reciprocal nature of the law-psychiatry interface manifests 
strongly with regard to expanding diagnostic coverage from 
prepubescent children to hebephilia, however it may be defined. Critics 
contend that the recent exaltation of hebephilia is fundamentally based 
on its forensic utility for the application of SVP laws.
299
 Partisanship is 
evident, as “for self-serving reasons, it is applauded by those who 
generally work for the prosecution and criticized by those who generally 
work for the defense.”300 Two other potential egocentric foundations 
exist. One involves the composition of the DSM-5 paraphilias workgroup 
 
293. Heather M. Moulden et al., Recidivism in Pedophiles: An Investigation Using 
Different Diagnostic Methods, 20 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 680, 693 (2009) 
(finding no difference in violent, sexual or general recidivism rates for extra-familial 
child molesters diagnosed with pedophilia or not); Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 268. 
294. Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 270; see also Moulden et al., supra note 293, 
at 693 (finding DSM diagnosis of pedophilia was negatively correlated with recidivism). 
But see United States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 620-21 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting longer 
sentence based in part on expert asserting that pedophilia correlates strongly and 
positively with sexual recidivism). 
295. Kingston et al., supra note 208, at 575; Moulden et al., supra note 293, at 698; 
Wilson et al., supra note 177, at 270. 
296. Marshall, supra note 199, at 16. 
297. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
298. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, No. 5:08-HC-2070, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
159498, at *22-23 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2012) (finding pedophilia diagnosis supported 
despite expert’s expressed discomfort that it be based solely on prior molestation). 
299. Frances & First, supra note 209, at 79; see also Fabian, Diagnosing and 
Litigating, supra note 94, at 501 (calling hebephilia a product of the “new-age” SVP 
laws). 
300. Robert Prentky & Howard Barbaree, Commentary: Hebephilia—A Would-be 
Paraphilia Caught in the Twilight Zone Between Pubescence and Adulthood, 39 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496, 508 (2011). 
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proposing that hebephilia be formally adopted as a subset of pedophilia. 
The chair is the author of several studies on which the workgroup is 
basing the purported empirical support for hebephilia.
301
 All four 
members of the workgroup would also appear to be incentivized to reach 
such a conclusion, considering they are specialists in sex offender 
treatment services,
302
 for which broadening diagnostic coverage would 
benefit. The second potential conflict regards another prominent 
promoter of hebephilia (as a subspecies of paraphilias NOS) who 
strongly advocates the diagnosis in an influential instruction manual he 
authored and aptly titled, Evaluating Sex Offenders: A Manual for Civil 
Commitments and Beyond.
303
 The latter’s influence is clear, as the author 
has testified supporting hebephilia as a proper diagnosis in numerous 
SVP court proceedings.
304
 
A vocal opponent calls hebephilia the DSM-5 workgroup’s “most 
flawed and blatantly overpathologizing paraphilia proposal.”305 There are 
several criticisms about the hebephilia diagnosis that expressly relate to 
the law-psychiatry interface. Clearly, the proposal to expand pedophilia 
conflates law enforcement with mental illness.
306
 The inclusion of 
hebephilia seems simply to cater to the interests of criminal justice 
officials.
307
 If the reason that sexual interest in a group (children) or 
object is a mental disorder is that they are illegal, this reasoning seriously 
comingles the professional realms of psychiatry and the law.
308
 The tie of 
 
301. Karen Franklin, Hebephilia: Quintessence of Diagnostic Pretextuality, 28 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 765 (2010) (suggesting chair using the post to lobby for the 
disorder which will “shape … forensic diagnosis of sex offenders for some time to 
come”); Kramer, supra note 241, at 233 (noting of the thirty-four studies cited in support 
ten co-authored by chair). But see James M. Cantor, The Errors of Karen Franklin’s 
Pretextuality, 11 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 59 (2012). 
302. Kramer, supra note 241, at 233 (of the thirty-four studies cited, thirty-one are 
from a sex offender management perspective). 
303. Franklin, supra note 301, at 760. The book is considered the bible for forensic 
evaluators in sex offender civil commitments. Thomas Zander, Commentary: Inventing 
Diagnosis for Civil Commitment of Rapists, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 459, 460 
(2008). 
304. E.g., United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13837, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2008); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 
1150 (D. Haw. 2008); In re Miller, No. 6-324, 05-1553, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at 
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 12, 2006); In re Risdal, No. 6-305, 05-0739, 2006 Iowa App. 
LEXIS 763, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 12, 2006); In re Atwood, No. 5-200, 03-1280, 
2005 Iowa App. LEXIS 333, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005). 
305. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 206. 
306. Zonana, supra note 258, at 247. 
307. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 205. 
308. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 256–57. 
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hebephilia to the law would also illogically render a diagnosis based on 
the legal age of consent in the offender’s particular jurisdiction. A federal 
district judge noticed this definitional problem: 
 
The age of legal consent is of no use to psychologists 
seeking a uniform diagnostic standard because the age of 
consent varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is one 
thing to criminalize conduct in one state that is legal in 
another. It is quite another to label a sexual interest 
pathological in Pennsylvania and normal in New 
York.
309
 
 
An academic has similarly remarked on the problem with correlating 
disorder with the age of consent: 
 
If a man with consistent patterns of sexual attraction to 
[sixteen]- and [seventeen]-year-old girls lives in a state 
where the age of consent is [sixteen] but works in a state 
where the age of consent is [eighteen], defining [a 
paraphilia] in terms of age of consent would mean that, 
if this man meets a clinical significance criterion, his 
mental disorder is cured everyday when he goes home 
from work.
310
 
 
Any incorporation of the legal age of consent would likewise defy the 
APA’s basic requirement that the delineation of a particular mental 
disorder should not be “primarily a result of social deviance or conflicts 
with society.”311 
 
2. Frye/Daubert Challenges 
 
Numerous defendants have brought legal challenges to the diagnosis 
of hebephilia, citing issues involving logic, normality, and science. 
Several cases contain references to concessions that attraction to 
 
309. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224 (D. Mass. 2009) (footnote 
omitted). 
310. Andrew C. Hinderliter, Defining Paraphilia in DSM-5: Do Not Disregard 
Grammar, 37 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 17, 23–24 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
311. Kramer, supra note 241, at 233. 
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postpubescents is not abnormal.
312
 For example, in a case involving 
sentencing for possession of child pornography, an expert testified that 
hebephilia could not be a psychological abnormality considering normal 
men are aroused by teenage girls.
313
 A federal court in another opinion 
documented the expert’s characterization as follows: 
 
[A]dults males to respond to a psychosexually mature 
young adolescent girl with the physical sexual 
characteristics of an adult woman would not be regarded 
as abnormal and unusual . . . . [T]hose images are used 
all the time in advertising and marketing because it’s 
understood that a sexually appealing adolescent is just 
that, sexually appealing.
314
 
 
Hebephilia would seem to be vulnerable under both the Frye and 
Daubert tests for admitting scientific evidence
315
 based on lack of 
general acceptance in the mental health field, while additionally subject 
to attack under Daubert for having little support from peer-reviewed 
studies, for having very low interrater reliability statistics,
316
 and for 
failing to follow the scientific method. Notwithstanding these 
considerations, overall, defendants have rarely succeeded in court in 
challenging a diagnosis based on hebephilia.
317
 Often the legal claim in 
 
312. E.g., United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13837, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2008); In re K.H., No. A-4375-09T2, 2010 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3032, at *7 (Ct. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2010); In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 
2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *5 (Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007). 
313. United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). The expert 
contended an entire area of sex offender literature has exploded around hebephilia: “It’s a 
very, very, very controversial and hot area right now.” Id. at 458. 
314. United States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (D. Mass. 2011). 
315. Frye is a common standard used to legally challenge whether new scientific 
evidence is reliable, using a test of whether the evidence has been generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific community. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
Daubert is the common alternative, providing suggestions for a court to determine the 
admissibility of expert evidence, including testability, peer review and publication, 
methodological standards (including the error rate), and general acceptance. Daubert v. 
Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). 
316. Paul Good & Jules Burstein, Hebephilia and the Construction of a Fictitious 
Diagnosis, 6 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 492, 493 (2012). The authors go on to state 
that “from a societal standpoint, prematurely legitimizing another sexually dangerous 
mental disorder may further contribute to the sexual panic now gripping the country, one 
in which child molesters are more feared than terrorists.” Id. (citation omitted). 
317. But see United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51 (finding it not 
a serious mental disorder, with an emphasis on serious). Though the court in United 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
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commitment proceedings is one of insufficiency of evidence, the 
argument being that hebephilia is factually inadequate to serve as a 
qualifying mental disorder.
318
 One called it a “made up diagnosis,”319 
while defense counsel in another argued it was junk science.
320
 A similar 
challenge has been that it is an invalid diagnosis violating the Frye 
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
321
 Yet case law 
indicates courts have almost universally accepted the diagnosis for legal 
purposes,
322
 even when state experts conceded it was not specifically 
contained within the DSM.
323
 In a representative state case, the defense 
expert contended that recurrent sexual behavior directed at adolescents 
could not qualify as a disorder of sexual appetite because the DSM’s 
focus was on sexual maturity, not cognitive ability to consent; instead he 
contended it was merely “bad behavior.”324 The court expressly rejected 
 
States v. Carta describes the Abregana result differently, suggesting the basis of not 
committing the defendant was on not finding the requisite future dangerousness. United 
States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 226 (D. Mass. 2009). Other cases also have turned 
not on the hebephilia diagnosis but on failing to find a likelihood to reoffend. 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, No. 05-1059C, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 77, at *4 (Super. 
Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); Commonwealth v. Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
318. E.g., In re Johnson, No. A11-792, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902, at 
*10 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2011); Berg v. State, 342 S.W.3d 374, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); 
In re M.N.A., No. A-4354-09T2, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3036, at *1 (Ct. App. 
Div. Dec. 17, 2010); In re Miller, No. 6-324/05-1435, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 720, at *1 
(Ct. App. July 12, 2006). 
319. In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *8 (Ct. App. 
Sept. 21, 2007). 
320. In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *5 
(Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007). 
321. In re Ayers, No. 3788-1-II, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 647, at *2 (Ct. App. Mar. 
30, 2010). 
322. E.g., State v. Alfredo M., 947 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (App. Div. 2012); In re 
Hooker, 968 N.E.2d 1087, 1096 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012); In re C.E.G., No. A-1624-11T2, 
2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1494, at *3 (Ct. App. Div. June 26, 2012); In re 
Jacobson, No. A11-2176, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 320, at *12 (Ct. App. Apr. 23, 
2012). 
323. E.g., State v. Spencer D., 946 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (App. Div. 2012); In re 
Johnson, No. A11-792, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902, at *13 (Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
2011); In re Dahl, No. 96,728, 2007 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 72, at *3 (Ct. App. Sept. 
21, 2007); In re E.J.S., No. A-0696-06T2, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2992, at *5 
(Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9, 2007); see also United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 
1153 (D. Haw. 2008) (conflicting testimony by defense experts where one indicates 
hebephilia not in any important literature while another contradicted this and admitted to 
having himself co-authored a chapter about its existence); Commonwealth v. Plucinski, 
868 A.2d 20, 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (indicating expert testified hebephilia may not be 
itemized in the DSM but is promulgated in professional literature). 
324. Commonwealth v. Rossmeisl, No. 1952-05, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 285, at *12 (Comm. Ct. Aug. 16, 2006). 
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that depiction and, instead, countenanced the use of hebephilia as a 
diagnosis for two reasons. For one, the court rejected the expert’s attempt 
to link the DSM’s nonconsenting aspect to sexual immaturity since doing 
so would effectively eliminate the DSM’s nonconsenting persons 
alternative.
325
 The second rationale was that rejecting hebephilia would 
create a loophole for individuals to have sexual contact with adolescents, 
but without the attribution of a disorder, they would not be eligible for 
sexually violent predator status. However, such explanation is 
concerning since the court appears to concede to the massaging of 
psychiatric principles to justify a significant legal consequence. 
Defendants have also attempted to convince federal judges that a 
hebephilia diagnosis was a poor fit for legal questions bearing significant 
consequences. Two federal district judges in Massachusetts have ruled to 
exclude from evidence testimony about hebephilia. In one, Judge Patti 
Saris (currently the chair of the United States Sentencing Commission) 
granted a motion to exclude evidence of a diagnosis of hebephilia upon 
finding the government had not shown that hebephilia was generally 
accepted as a mental disorder by professionals who assess sexually 
violent offenders.
326
 The following year, a colleague cited Judge Saris’s 
opinion and similarly ruled in the case of United States v. Carta that a 
diagnosis of hebephilia violated the Daubert standard of admissibility for 
expert evidence, as it was not recognized by the psychiatric community 
as a serious mental disorder.
327
 The Carta district judge was convinced 
by the court-appointed expert’s contentions that hebephilia was not a 
valid diagnosis, consistent criteria for assessment were unavailable, its 
omission from the DSM showed it was not generally accepted, the 
paraphilia diagnostic criteria referring to children assumes prepubescent 
(not post-pubescent) youth, and normal adults find sexually mature 
teenagers arousing.
328
 Further, the jurist criticized the diagnosis for 
blurring the distinction between criminal conduct and pathological 
 
325. Id. at *13 (suggesting not recognizing a disorder related to adolescents who 
legally cannot consent is “illogical and at odds” with the DSM). 
326. United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837, at 
*4 (1st. Cir. Feb. 26, 2008). The judge eventually approved the civil commitment based 
on diagnosis of pedophilia. United States v. Shields, 597 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Mass. 
2009). 
327. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 225 n.166 (D. Mass. 2009). 
328. Id. at 218. “Should an eighteen-year-old, for example, who is sexually 
interested in a fifteen-year-old be treated the same as a fifty-year-old interested in the 
same fifteen-year-old?” Id. at 224-25. 
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illness.
329
 But these rulings—that hebephilia was not an accepted mental 
disorder for civil commitment purposes—was quickly reversed on appeal 
by a First Circuit panel.
330
 
The First Circuit panel overturning the lower court’s Carta decision 
commented that a mental disorder need not be accepted by consensus in 
the medical community to be legally sufficient for civil commitment 
purposes and, in any event, it found there was sufficient evidence that a 
hebephilia diagnosis could exist in the DSM’s paraphilia framework.331 
The panel interpreted the DSM paraphilia NOS criteria as broad enough 
to apply to a fixation on teenagers.
332
 On remand, the case was 
reassigned to Judge Saris, who later adjudged the defendant eligible for 
commitment based on hebephilia.
333
 Still seemingly concerned about 
hebephilia capturing interest in older teens, she highlighted that the 
experts in the case had limited their diagnostic specification to attraction 
involving pubescent children ages eleven to fourteen.
334
 She appeared 
influenced, in part, by the fact that the diagnosis with that age range was 
under consideration for inclusion in DSM-5.
335
 
Despite the First Circuit’s Carta decision, a federal district judge in 
the Fourth Circuit has in several cases in 2012 ruled against the 
introduction of hebephilia, determining that it is insufficient for civil 
commitment purposes.
336
 The court credited the defense expert’s 
testimony that the DSM does not actually list hebephilia, numerous 
psychologists have rejected it, and arousal to pubescent and 
postpubescent is not abnormal even if acting on it might violate the 
 
329. Id. at 227. 
330. United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010). 
331. Id. at 40. Another First Circuit panel has likewise ruled that “even if the issue 
begins and ends with the DSM,” hebephilia is covered by the nonconsenting persons 
language and the DSM does not otherwise exclude pubescent children as the focus of 
attraction. United States v. Wetmore, 700 F.3d 570, 578 (4th Cir. 2012). 
332. Id. at 41. The court cautioned that its decision did not mean everyone attracted 
to sexually mature teenagers would be hebephiles since diagnosis requires additional 
criteria. Id. 
333. United States v. Carta, No. 07-12064-PBS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73007, at 
*1 (D. Mass. 2011). 
334. Id. at *33. 
335. Id. 
336. United States v. Shea, No. 5:11-HC-2136-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94182, 
at *12-13 (E.D.N.C. July 9, 2012); United States v. Caporale, No. 5:08-HC-2037-BO, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55794, at *8-9 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2012); United States v. 
Hamelin, No. 5:09-HC-2028-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54790, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 
2012); United States v. Neuhauser, No. 5:07-HC-2101-BO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7008, 
at *5-6 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012). 
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law.
337
 Indeed, in one of these cases, the judge also summarily rejected 
the state’s Daubert challenge to strike the defense expert’s testimony 
thereon.
338
 His decisions are important considering that his judicial 
district is a primary jurisdictional venue for federal civil commitments.
339
 
Nonetheless, whatever victory these decisions may have held in favor of 
rationally assessing the evidence here was short-lived. The Fourth Circuit 
reversed at least one of these decisions, soundly rejecting that hebephilia 
as a matter of law cannot qualify as a mental impairment justifying civil 
commitment.
340
 Citing, in part, the First Circuit’s Carta opinion, the 
appellate panel concluded that 
 
[t]hough his condition may elude definitive labeling, the 
evidence at hearing established that [defendant’s] ability 
to function normally in society has been preempted by 
his sexual fixation on underage, pubescent boys, such 
fixation having heretofore so dominated his psyche as to 
substantially impair and disrupt his life.
341
 
 
In general, current precedents, including two federal appellate 
opinions, in favor of hebephilia, as admissible evidence in criminal cases 
and a qualifying mental disorder for commitment purposes, mean that it 
is likely to flourish in the law.
342
 However, it appears an extremely poor 
fit for legal decisions. Much evidence attests that hebephilia is 
scientifically and normatively flawed: it is not based on empirical 
evidence, no consistent diagnostic criteria exist for it, forensic experts are 
 
337. Caporale, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55794, at *8 ; Hamelin, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 54790, at *8; Shea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94182, at *12. 
338. Caporale, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55794, at *16. 
339. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ sexual predator commitment program is 
located at a facility in Butner, North Carolina. Derek Gilna, Federal Sex Offender Civil 
Commitment Process Under Fire, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, August 2012, at 1, 7. 
340. United States v. Caporale, No. 12-6832, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25014, at *22 
(4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2012). 
341. Id. at *22. 
342. United States v. Cooke, No. 5:09-HC-02034-FL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
37051, at *17 (E.D.N.C. March 18, 2013) (overruling objection that hebephilia is not a 
valid diagnosis); United States v. Antone, No. 5:07-HC-2042-FL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
137049, at *5, 8 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (disagreeing with magistrate’s determination 
that paraphilia NOS-nonconsent for hebephilia was not a valid diagnosis because even 
though it is not specifically in the DSM, because the “term could conceivably be used to 
describe a person with abnormal sexual arousal toward nonconsenting sexual 
encounters.”). 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
ADJUDICATING SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE 7/26/2013 4:32 PM 
588 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
giving widely varying descriptions of its scope in case law, and interest 
in pubescent and post-pubescent youth is not inherently deviant or 
pathological. With the ambiguity in its ties to physical characteristics or 
age, it might be a slippery slope toward incorporating even older 
teenagers. The likelihood of many false positives is troubling. Further, 
making the definition dependent on the legal age of consent represents an 
unfortunate overlap between criminal law and psychiatric diagnosis. As 
other commentators have appropriately warned, “prematurely 
legitimizing another sexually dangerous mental disorder may further 
contribute to the sexual panic now gripping the country, one in which 
child molesters are more feared than terrorists.”343 
 
C. Rape as Mental Disease 
 
Assertions of pretextuality and the merger of legal interests with 
psychiatry are supported, too, in conceiving rape as a signifier of mental 
disorder. Numerous cases exist where experts use rape as the proxy for 
diagnosing mental disease.
344
 Admittedly, several attempts have been 
made over the years to specifically include rape as a paraphilia in the 
DSM. Yet a specific rape-type paraphilia has been formally rejected 
several times.
345
 The latest attempt was to add what would have been 
called paraphilic coercive disorder to DSM-5. Still, the working group 
designated it as specifically reserved in text of the DSM-5 to be the 
subject of continued formal review, which indicates the proposition 
survives on.
346
 Experts continue to diagnose rape as indicating mental 
disease and, as a recent empirical study of legal decisions shows, courts 
are overwhelmingly receptive.
347
 Judicial opinions show state experts 
giving various explanations for utilizing rape paraphilia despite the 
 
343. Good & Burstein, supra note 316, at 493. 
344. Sexual sadism is another potential diagnosis for rape but will not be addressed 
in more detail here as it is far less frequently employed and has rarely been contested in 
case decisions. 
345. Thornton, supra note 66, at 412; Richard Wollert, Paraphilic Coercive 
Disorder Does Not Belong in DSM-5 for Statistical, Historical, Conceptual, and 
Practical Reasons, 40 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1097 (2011). 
346. Richard Balon, Controversies in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Paraphilias, 
39 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 7, 13 (2013). 
347. Chris King et al., Forensic Usage of the Paraphilia NOS, Nonconsent 
Diagnosis: A Case Law Survey, Presentation at the American Psychological-Law Society 
Annual Conference (March 2012), available at 
http://www.drexel.edu/~/media/Files/psychology/labs/heilbrun/presentations/AP-
LS2012ParaphiliaNOSNonconsent.ashx. 
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APA’s rejections. These include that the absence is due to feminists not 
wanting to give rapists a tool to exonerate them,
348
 feminist politics 
conceptualizing rape as a violent crime and not a sex crime,
349
 and a 
more generic conclusion that this treatment is the result of social and 
political pressures on the APA.
350
 Often they justify the diagnosis using 
existing DSM language through the paraphilia NOS residual, with its 
language regarding sexual behaviors involving nonconsenting persons. 
Their argument is that victims of rape are by definition not consenting.
351
 
This version of rape paraphilia is commonly designated paraphilia NOS-
nonconsent. 
 
1. Theoretical Rebuttals 
 
There are several strong criticisms against specifically recognizing a 
rape paraphilia. An empirical challenge is that such a diagnosis lacks any 
evidence of reliability or validity.
352
 One reason may be that sexual 
interest in the coercive aspect of the behavior is lacking. Studies fail to 
support the idea that men who rape are aroused by the coerciveness per 
se; rather, it appears that any coercion and aggression needed to achieve 
the sexual encounter simply fail to inhibit males who are hypersexual, 
antisocial, or lack an appreciation of the other person’s resistance.353 At 
the same time, there is evidence that many rapes are more about power 
and control than sexual motivation.
354
 A review of historical perspectives 
on the reasons men rape uncovered evidence of five types of rapists: 
 
(1) disadvantaged men who resort to rape, (2) 
“specialized” rapists who are sexually aroused by violent 
sex, (3) men who rape opportunistically, (4) high-
mating-effort men who are dominant and often 
psychopathic, and (5) partner rapists motivated by 
 
348. People v. Hardin, No. A119690, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3611, at *5 
n.2 (Ct. App. May 6, 2009). 
349. People v. Thomas, No. C035786, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *7 
(Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002). 
350. People v. Dodele, No. A097675, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1458, at *2 
n.2 (Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2003). 
351. Thomas, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *3. 
352. Wollert, supra note 345. 
353. Raymond A. Knight, Is a Diagnostic Category for Paraphilic Coercive 
Disorder Defensible?, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 419, 424 (2010). 
354. Zander, supra note 303, at 461. 
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assessments of increased risk of sperm competition.
355
 
 
Any presumption that rapists are mentally disordered is also belied 
by the (unfortunate) frequency of sexual assaults. It has reasonably been 
argued that the “number of nonconsensual sexual acts among 
psychiatrically normal people suggests that this hypothesis is simply 
social control dressed up as pop psychology.”356 
Others contend that formally accepting rape paraphilia specifically 
in the DSM would signify the mental health community succumbing to 
societal pressure rather than adhering to scientific principles.
357
 Whether 
expressly within the DSM or not, rape paraphilia diagnoses are driving 
legal decisions across jurisdictions.
358
 The result is a medicalization of 
rape by reframing the crime of rape into mental illness.
359
 And it appears 
evident that the reason for reifying rape paraphilia is much less about 
clinical concern and treatment as it is to serve criminal justice interests. 
For example, a prosecutor who pursues sex offender civil commitment 
(and is a member of the DSM-5 paraphilia working group) has argued in 
favor of the APA formally recognizing a mental disorder to apply to 
repeat rapists.
360
 He discounted criticism that a DSM diagnosis should 
not be based solely on past behavior by pointing out that many DSM 
disorders are applicable to prior criminal conduct.
361
 
 
2. Due Process Challenges 
 
Despite significant empirical and theoretical challenges, courts 
continue to reject legal challenges to evidence of a rape paraphilia. In the 
apparently few cases in which defendants have sought Frye/Daubert 
 
355. William F. McKibbin et al., Why Do Men Rape? An Evolutionary 
Psychological Perspective, 12 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 86, 89 (2008). 
356. Wakefield, supra note 64, at 208. 
357. Zonana, supra note 258, at 249. 
358. Conover v. Main, No. 11-632(PGS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36780, at *7 (D. 
N.J. March 18, 2013); Sullivan v. Kramer, No. C 09-3690 RS (PIC), at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 26, 2012); In re Trulock, 970 N.E.2d 560, 566 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); In re J.E., No. 
A-5297-08T2, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1120, at *8 (Ct. App. Div. May 22, 
2012); People v. Welch, No. H035567, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2519, at *5 (Ct. 
App. Apr. 3, 2012); In re Smallwood, No. A11-1971, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
230, at *18-19 (Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2012). 
359. Hinderliter, supra note 167, at 252; Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 101. 
360. Paul Stern, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder in the DSM: The Right Diagnosis for 
the Right Reason, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1443, 1444 (2010). 
361. Id. at 1446. 
55
ADJUDICATING SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE 7/26/2013 4:32 PM 
2013] SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE 591 
hearings to challenge its admissibility as a scientific or medical 
construct, courts have rejected the need for such hearings.
362
 Concerning 
Frye, judges reason that Frye is focused on whether a new scientific 
theory has achieved general acceptance. Since psychology as a science is 
not novel and paraphilia diagnoses are standard psychological 
applications, Frye is wholly inapplicable.
363
 
Due process challenges to the inadequacy of a diagnosis of rape 
paraphilia for the purpose of civil commitment proceedings have failed 
in virtually every case.
364
 The basis of these challenges generally derives 
from Supreme Court jurisprudence. In a 1992 case generally addressing 
the constitutionality of civil commitment, the Court noted that the due 
process clause protects at its core a liberty interest in being free from 
bodily restraint imposed by arbitrary governmental action.
365
 The Court 
confirmed that civil commitment qualified as a significant deprivation of 
that liberty interest.
366
 Nonetheless, in Kansas v. Hendricks,
367
 a case 
about SVP civil commitment, the Supreme Court ruled that it intended to 
leave much flexibility to states in what terminology and which qualifying 
mental impairments were sufficient. However, a concurring opinion 
recognized a potential constitutional impediment, surmising that if a 
qualifying mental disorder or disability was “too imprecise a category to 
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our 
precedents would not suffice to validate it.”368 The Seventh Circuit 
interpreted this potential constitutional challenge as follows: 
 
 
 
362. In re Williams, No. 65436-5-1, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 1127, *14 (Ct. App. 
May 14, 2012); In re Lopez, No. 40827-9-II, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 198, at *15-16 
(Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012). 
363. Williams, 2012 App. LEXIS 1127, at *14; Lopez, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 
198, at *15; In re Berry, 248 P.3d 592, 595 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Williams, 264 
P.3d 570, 575 n.11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
364. E.g., Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2010); Yancy v. Voss, No. 
SACV 06-356-JFW(CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43880, at *44 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 
2011); King v. Demorales, No. CV 08-4984-TJH (JEM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, 
at *62 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2010); In re Post, 187 P.3d 803, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see 
also Hoisington v. Williams, No. CV-07-332-LRS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93364, at *20 
(E.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2008) (explaining defendant had not referred to any cases in which 
the diagnoses of paraphilias has not met general acceptance standards); In re Marrten, 
No. 61923-3-I 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at *9 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010). 
365. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
366. Id. 
367. 521 U.S. 346, 447 (1997). 
368. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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[A] medical diagnosis can be based on so little evidence 
that bears on the controlling legal criteria that any 
reliance upon it would be a violation of due process. 
Therefore, a particular diagnosis may be so devoid of 
content, or [of] so near-universal in its rejection by 
mental health professionals, that a court’s reliance on it 
to satisfy the “mental disorder” prong of the statutory 
requirements for commitment would violate due 
process.
369
 
 
Detainees under sexual predator civil commitment have waged 
constitutional challenges that rape paraphilia is too vague for substantive 
due process purposes. These arguments have been slightly varied. 
Defendants have argued that it is an invalid diagnosis
370
 or too imprecise 
as a qualifying disorder for due process purposes.
371
 Similarly, other 
defendants have challenged that the paraphilia for rape is not based on 
sound scientific principles
372
 and not generally accepted.
373
 Others have 
invoked the relevance of the partisan expert factions that have developed, 
asserting that such a diagnosis was “only accepted by an extreme 
minority primarily composed of state-employed professionals charged 
with civil commitment evaluations.”374 One expert noted that it was a 
“so-called ‘diagnosis’” used primarily by SVP evaluators and merely 
“doublespeak for the crime of rape.”375 Some litigants have justified their 
 
369. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 577 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
370. Id. at 577; Page v. California, No. 1:06-cv-01409, LJO DLB PC, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 72652, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008); In re Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 
631 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); In re Marrten, No. 61923-3-I, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at 
*1 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010). 
371. King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, at *55; People v. Thomas, No. 
C035786, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *30 (Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002); see 
also People v. Pedersen, No. A 115239, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9962, at *15 (Ct. 
App. Dec. 11, 2007) (rejecting evidentiary challenge to paraphilia NOS as “meaningless” 
and “unsupported”). 
372. Brown, 599 F.3d at 610; In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 575 n.11 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2011); In re Post, 187 P.3d at 803, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see also People v. 
Cordero, No. B223215, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2780, at *8 (Ct. App. Apr. 15, 
2011) (expert acknowledging “an inherently weak construct [without] without defined 
criteria”). 
373. Williams, 264 P.3d at 577 (claim procedurally defaulted); see also Marrten, 
2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at *8 (challenging construct as overbroad and imprecise 
and not generally recognized in the psychiatric field). 
374. McGee 593 F.3d at 578. 
375. State v. McCuistion, 275 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Wash. 2012). 
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due process argument on the failure of the DSM to include a paraphilia 
specifically for rape.
376
 The defense in one federal case indicated its 
omission from the DSM meant it psychiatrically did not exist,
377
 while in 
another case the defense argued its exclusion demonstrated the consensus 
view in the profession that such a disorder is invalid and unreliable.
378
 
Federal courts have rejected such due process challenges. In 
declining due process challenges to rape paraphilia, courts have often 
pointed to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggesting much flexibility 
in qualifying disorders for purposes of sex offender civil commitment.
379
 
For example, the Seventh Circuit in two separate cases rejected due 
process challenges on the invalidity of rape paraphilia, drawing on 
several quotations from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that 
recognize differences between law and psychiatry: “the science of 
psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal 
determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions do not 
seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”380 Correspondingly, Hendricks 
indicated that “[l]egal definitions . . . which must take into account such 
issues and individual responsibility . . . and competency, need not mirror 
those advanced by the medical profession.”381 Thus, “states must have 
appropriate room to make practical, common-sense judgments” as to 
what qualifies as mental conditions sufficient for civil commitment.
382
 
The Seventh Circuit ruled that these precedents signify that any 
controversy as to whether a diagnosis can meet the legal standard for a 
mental disorder is best resolved as an evidentiary question with cross 
examination exposing the relevant strengths and weaknesses.
383
 
 
 
 
 
 
376. In re Berry, 248 P.3d 592, 596 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); see also King, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, at *59 (noting defendant’s contention paraphilia NOS-
nonconsent is a temporary diagnosis within the DSM). 
377. Brown, 599 F.3d at 607. 
378. McGee, 593 F.3d at 574. 
379. McCuistion, 275 P.3d at 1103; King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, at *61. 
380. Brown, 599 F.3d at 611 (quoting Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)). 
381. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)); McGee, 593 
F.3d at 569 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359); King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126708, 
at *61. 
382. Brown, 599 F.3d at 611; McGee, 593 F.3d at 580. 
383. McGee, 593 F.3d at 612. 
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The debate as to whether rape paraphilia can be a valid diagnosis 
under the DSM is also unpersuasive to state courts.
384
 Several courts 
have explained that whether a disorder was explicitly contained in the 
DSM or whether there was disagreement among professionals were not 
dispositive issues, but simply factors to be considered by the trier of 
fact.
385
 A recent Illinois case is particularly instructive as it included the 
testimony of a professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University 
School of Medicine who had served as chair of certain APA workgroups 
assigned to consider changes in the definitions of paraphilias in DSM-III 
and DSM-IV.
386
 At trial, the state offered two experts who, conceding 
controversy about the diagnosis and that it was not specifically listed as a 
disorder, testified that sufficient support existed within the DSM 
paraphilia section’s criteria to warrant it.387 The Johns Hopkins professor, 
testifying for the defense, stated that it was inappropriate to combine 
paraphilia NOS with the separate diagnostic feature involving non-
consenting persons; moreover, he confirmed that the APA had expressly 
rejected that diagnosis and there was no scientific support for it.
388
 
Despite the apparent significance of this expert’s testimony, the court 
merely viewed it as reflecting a question of fact for the fact finder to 
resolve in terms of judging the credibility of the conflicting expert 
opinions.
389
 In concluding that express coverage in the DSM is not 
dispositive, the court commented that “we cannot adopt any rule that 
asks the DSM to . . . answer the ultimate legal questions or create a 
perfect fit between law and medicine.”390 
In several other cases, federal and state courts have evaded 
evidentiary challenges to rape paraphilia by simple deference; that is, 
simply recognizing that other courts accepted the diagnosis and 
 
384. In re Lopez, No. 40827-9-II, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 198, at *17 (Ct. App. 
Jan. 31, 2012); People v. Dacayana, No. B164664, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6871, 
at *10 (Ct. App. July 22, 2004) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)) 
(embracing the idea that medical and legal concepts are not synonymous and rape 
paraphilia is acceptable). 
385. People v. Pedersen, No. A115239, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9962, at 
*17-18 (Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007); In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶ 19, 787 N.W.2d 752, 759 
(2010); People v. Foster, No. B183315, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 568, at *15 (Ct. 
App. Jan. 24, 2007); People v. Thomas, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11548, at *32-33 
(Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002). 
386. In re Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 619–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
387. Id. at 631. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. at 632 (citing McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 576 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
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permitting it.
391
 Another method of avoiding addressing legal challenges 
has simply been to rule them procedurally defaulted when defendants 
failed to object to the evidence at trial.
392
 
Overall, the use of rape paraphilia per se and the use of the 
polymorphous category of paraphilia NOS to provide a mental disorder 
diagnosis for repeat rapists supports a thesis that mental health evaluators 
are willing to expand diagnostic coverage for case adjudications. In the 
face of significant flaws in the scientific, theoretical, and legal bases for 
such a disorder, the proposition that the use of mental disorders to serve 
prosecutorial interests is merely pretextual also appears to be supported. 
The crime of rape becomes a proxy for mental disease. 
 
D. Ethical Considerations 
 
The law-psychiatry interface here may do a disservice to the 
independence and ethical values of both professions. Together, the 
significant harm that sexual victimization causes, the monolithic fear of 
the sexual predator, and the political clout behind SVP laws has 
debilitated the assessment process.
393
 Systemically, concern for false 
negatives overrides that of false positives.
394
 Even those performing the 
evaluations operate more from pessimism than optimism by being more 
concerned with being wrong in not diagnosing paraphilia, and the 
potential harms if wrong, rather than focusing on the likelihood of being 
scientifically accurate.
395
 
A critic has charged that American psychiatry as an institution has 
been complicit in encouraging SVP laws with its “relentless and 
extensive campaign to extend the scope and power of their influence in 
the administration of justice, in the disposition of offenders, and in the 
 
391. See, e.g., Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2008); Yancy v. Voss, 
No. SACV 06-356-JFW(CW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43880, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 
2011); King v. Demorales, No. CV 08-4984-TJH, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 126708, at *60–
61 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2010); Hoisington v. Williams, No. CV-07-332-LRS, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 93364, at *19 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 30. 2008); People v. O’Shell, 92 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 57, 59 n.2 (2009); In re Post, 187 P.3d 803, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
392. E.g., In re Williams, 264 P.3d 570, 577 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Marrten, 
No. 61923-3-I, 2010 Wash. App. LEXIS 382, at *9 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010); In re 
Cannon, No. 61841-5-I, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 1880, at *5 (Ct. App. July 27, 2009); 
see also Page v. California, No. 1:06-cv-01409 LJO DLB PC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
72652, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008) (rejecting habeas as alternative remedy existed). 
393. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360. 
394. Id. 
395. Wollert & Cramer, supra, note 257, at 563. 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/2
ADJUDICATING SEX CRIMES AS MENTAL DISEASE 7/26/2013 4:32 PM 
596 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
policies and practices of correctional institutions and agencies.”396 To be 
fair, individual assessors are not likely acting on their own, as observers 
note the “increasing tendency for experts to stretch or distort the 
science—to introduce bad science—in response to the strong advocacy 
pressures inherent in SVP proceedings.”397 The nature of the advocacy 
process of the law itself invites bias, including forensic bias and 
confirmatory bias. Forensic bias can occur through financial incentive, a 
desire to please, empathizing with a litigant or retaining attorney, or 
becoming involved in the adversarial process by steadfastly defending 
one’s position in face of the cross examination.398 Confirmatory bias is 
possible where one’s initial hypothesis or diagnosis is not reevaluated but 
confirmed through the selective collection of supporting evidence.
399
 
Another avenue for bias is when the evaluator fails to independently 
assess the individual, which occurs often in forensic evaluations of sex 
offenders. A survey of evaluators in sex offender civil commitment 
proceedings uncovered evidence which the authors indicate suggest that 
many evaluators routinely rely upon a documented history of paraphilia 
without independently assessing it.
400
 A commentator has warned that 
mental health evaluators are on an ethical tightrope with “the pulling 
forces of forensic identification and bias, personal and moral beliefs 
about SVP legislation, and financial, personal, and reputation demands to 
be allegiant to their retaining lawyers inherently may cause a nasty fall, 
and ultimately they may have to choose one side or the other.”401 
With respect to the application of SVP laws, the law’s utilization of 
the disease model, with its referential use of mental disorders and the 
need for psychiatric experts to provide such diagnoses, displeases several 
 
396. Michael Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and 
Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 650, 651 (1958). 
397. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 360. 
398. Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators, supra note 264, at 94. Forensic 
identification leads to bias when an assessor is influenced through inquiry by the 
retaining expert. Forensic identification occurs through primacy and anchoring bias. 
Primacy occurs with the initial case conceptualized by the potentially retaining attorney 
who provides a theory which develops into the expert’s working hypothesis and expected 
outcome. Anchoring bias occurs when the expert refuses to reverse initial impression 
despite new or alternative information. Id. at 89. 
399. Id. at 90; see also Prentky et al., Muddy Diagnostic Waters, supra note 265, at 
456 (contending clinicians in SVP proceedings arrive at conclusions and then gather data 
to justify a priori conclusions). 
400. Jackson & Hess, supra note 137, at 440; see, e.g., State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 684, 
661 (Conn. 2005) (diagnosis of sexual sadism based on other psychiatrists’ reports). 
401. Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators, supra note 264, at 95. 
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mental health professionals.
402
 A professor of psychiatry at Yale ruefully 
challenges his colleagues as forensic specialists: “Our culture has 
initiated a ‘war on sex offenders’ and the legal system has geared up to 
wage it. Since we have made the diagnosis almost completely overlap 
with the crime, we have become overly enmeshed with legal goals.”403 
The law-psychiatry interface here alarms some mental health 
practitioners, too, in that shoehorning diagnoses to serve legal interests 
impedes a focus on best practices in treating sex offenders and 
preventing relapse.
404
 “Psychiatry, unlike the law, does not regard these 
patients as a homogeneous group of individuals who have simply 
violated ‘bright-line’ boundaries dividing proscribed from permitted 
sexual behaviors.”405 SVP laws were largely created with little attention 
to these realities.
406
 
From a philosophical perspective, to confuse legal and scientific 
categories is to commit what some philosophers call the naturalistic 
fallacy—i.e., thoughtlessly equating what is with what ought to be.407 In 
any event, there are calls for all participants in the legal process to make 
substantive improvements. These include mental health experts focusing 
on standardization and attempting to have greater transparency if 
diagnosing paraphilia NOS in revealing their rationale.
408
 Lawyers on 
both sides should require more clarity about the diagnoses when 
introduced in legal proceedings,
409
 should improve their knowledge 
about the scientific foundations of the evidence in order to wage legal 
challenges, and should ask more probing questions to better assist the 
trier of fact. Finally, judges should take a stronger stand by acting as 
circumspect gatekeepers
410
 by reevaluating whether evidence of mental 
disorders should be admissible, as legally relevant, under Frye/Daubert 
expert evidence standards, and compatible with constitutional due 
process considerations. 
 
402. Kramer, supra note 241, at 234 (“Psychiatry is not a helping profession when 
it takes an adversarial stance toward such patients and exacerbates rather than relieves 
psychiatric symptoms.”). 
403. Zonana, supra note 258, at 248. 
404. Saleh et al., supra note 5, at 366. 
405. Id. at 361. 
406. Id.; see also Fabian, Paraphilias and Predators, supra note 264, at 83 (noting 
the DSM was not created for the “application of behaviorally driven symptomatology to 
answer legal questions”). 
407. Prentky et al., supra note 27, at 359–60. 
408. Frances et al., supra note 128, at 383. 
409. Id. 
410. See Prentky et al., Muddy Diagnostic Waters, supra note 265, at 458. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
Fear of sexual predators has led society to adopt a law-psychiatry 
interface in which sexual offending is merged into a disease-based 
philosophy to justify various forms of punishment and preventive 
control. Sex crimes have become conflated with psychiatric disease. The 
multiple concerns expressed herein strongly suggest that the use of the 
psychiatric paraphilias in legal proceedings tends to undermine the 
independence and integrity of the legal and psychiatric professions. For 
the mental health field, the vagary of diagnostic criteria and the 
significant discretion subsequently provided has led to inconsistent and 
questionable diagnoses. The scientific requirements of validity and 
reliability make the DSM paraphilias highly questionable even for 
treatment purposes. For legal purposes, considering the significant 
negative consequences that follow, they are a poor fit in the law. The 
widespread acceptance of mental disorders for sexual deviance, despite 
these substantial scientific problems, ignores significant issues of due 
process and equity considering they help dictate infringements on 
fundamental interests of defendants. 
Unfortunately, it appears that law and psychiatry will remain 
complicit in adapting diagnoses of mental illness to criminal justice 
officials’ desire to control sex offenders. Academics and practitioners 
have sought the removal of the paraphilias from the DSM because 
labeling sexual behaviors as pathological has done great harm to many 
defendants.
411
 However, it is also recognized that removing the 
paraphilias, most particularly pedophilia, would be a public relations 
disaster for psychiatry.
412
 The APA’s continuing involvement is evident 
with the overuse of paraphilia NOS, for example, and its ongoing 
consideration of adopting new paraphilias, such as rape paraphilia and 
hebephilia, that serve prosecutorial interests. The law’s entrenchment is 
likewise strong, including the repeated acceptance in judicial decisions 
favorably embracing mental disease for sexual deviance—even those not 
otherwise specified—threatens to permit more shoehorning diagnoses to 
satisfy criminal justice goals. The collaboration threatens not only the 
liberty and privacy interests of those who commit sex-based offenses. 
The potential exists for a contagion effect whereby interest groups might 
be encouraged to qualify all manner of criminal behaviors as distinct 
 
411. Moser & Kleinplatz, supra note 39, at 107. 
412. Robert L. Spitzer, Sexual and Gender Identify Disorders: Discussion of 
Questions for DSM-V, 17 J. PSYCHOL. & HUM. SEXUALITY 111, 115 (2005). 
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mental disorders.
413
 Accordingly, if the interaction between law and 
psychiatry continues in this manner, all criminals may be deemed to have 
mental disorders. This outcome makes no logical sense, undermines the 
core tenets of the law, infringes upon fundamental rights, and 
methodically destroys trust in the science of psychiatry. 
 
 
413. Zonana, supra note 258, at 246. 
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